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Introduction
An important question with which lower courts have been wrestling for
decades—and which the United States Supreme Court may soon address—
is the extent to which the First Amendment permits governmental
prohibitions on lies in political campaigns.1 To date, most courts have
analyzed such laws as if they were content-based restriction on public
discourse; the restrictions are thus subjected to “strict scrutiny,” which
almost always leads to the law’s invalidation. In this Article, I offer a
different (and, I believe, more helpful) framework for judging the
constitutionality of laws restricting campaign lies. I suggest that the basic
inquiry in these cases should be whether the law in question is properly
considered a regulation within the domain of public discourse, where
1. In this Article I use the term “lie” to mean a statement of fact that the speaker knows
to be untrue or which is made with reckless disregard of whether the statement is true or not.
See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968) (stating that a statement is made with
reckless disregard of the truth if the speaker “entertained serious doubts” as to the truth of
the statement). Some of the regulations discussed in this Article prohibit a broader category
of expression, including literally true statements intended to mislead the audience. Most of
the bans on campaign lies that I discuss, however, consistent with my usage involve factual
misstatements that were either knowingly or recklessly made.
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government’s ability to regulate the content of speech, including lies, is
indeed strictly limited; or, alternatively, whether the law is a regulation of
speech in the election domain, a government-managed sphere where
government has considerable authority to regulate the content of speech to
promote the fairness and efficiency of elections.
Part I of this Article offers a comprehensive review of the relevant case
law. Section I.A discusses the pertinent United States Supreme Court
decisions. Although the Court has yet to directly rule on the
constitutionality of a law prohibiting campaign lies, cases it has decided on
related matters leave little doubt that it would invalidate on First
Amendment grounds any broad ban on campaign lies. At the same time,
however, these cases show that the Court is uncertain about the
constitutionality of narrowly crafted laws targeting lies particularly
injurious to the fairness or integrity of the electoral process. Section I.B
discusses the lower court decisions. In the 1970s and ‘80s, courts were
divided about the constitutionality of comprehensive bans on campaign lies.
By the 1990s, however, the lower courts increasingly began to express
skepticism about the validity of these laws and, consistent with what I have
inferred from the Supreme Court decisions, have since the beginning of this
century uniformly invalidated comprehensive bans on campaign lies. An
open and pressing question, then, is the fate of narrow bans on lies
concerning such matters as a candidate’s incumbency or party affiliation, or
about the time and place of an election.
As discussed in Part II, the answer to the question turns largely on the
scope of a key component of the Supreme Court’s First Amendment
jurisprudence—the rule against content regulation. Section II.A describes
the All-Inclusive Approach, a view that insists that, except for few narrow
categories of expression, the rule against content discrimination applies to
all speech. On this view, even limited, specifically targeted bans on
campaign lies would likely be deemed unconstitutional. Section II.B
describes the Domain-Specific Approach, an alternative—and, I believe,
preferable—view of the scope of the rule against content discrimination. On
this view, the rule against content regulation is primarily confined to public
discourse, a domain consisting of expression essential to democratic selfgovernance. In other domains, particularly those which government
manages to accomplish some particular purpose, government has far more
leeway to regulate the content of speech. It is indisputable that government
has the constitutional authority to manage elections by, for instance, setting
the time for an election, providing voting apparatus, counting the ballots,
and announcing the results. In addition, the Supreme Court has in several
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cases upheld as part of this managerial authority the power of states
regulate the content of election-related speech, such as by prohibiting writein voting and banning electioneering near the polls. The difficult question,
therefore, is not whether a government-managed domain of elections exists
or whether in exercising its authority to manage that domain, government
can sometimes constitutionally regulate the content of speech. Rather, the
hard question is how to properly allocate regulations of expression, such as
bans on campaign lies, at the cusp of the domains of public discourse and
elections.
Part III addresses this crucial allocation question. It suggests that this
allocation should depend upon (1) the extent to which the law in question
promotes the fairness and efficiency of elections, as compared to (2) the
extent that the law impairs the democratic function of public discourse.
Laws comprehensively banning lies by anyone about ballot measures or
candidates would seriously impair the democratic function of public
discourse while not directly advancing the fairness or efficiency of
elections. Such regulations should therefore be considered part of public
discourse and accordingly be invalidated. In contrast, laws prohibiting lies
about the time, place, or manner of elections, such as “Republicans vote on
Tuesday, Democrats on Wednesday,” directly promote the fairness and
efficiency of elections while not adversely impacting on public discourse.
Such laws, therefore, should be allocated to the election domain and usually
upheld. Between these two poles lie harder cases, both in terms of domain
allocation and ultimate disposition. A law prohibiting candidates from lying
about their opponents, for instance, presents a particularly difficult case.
Because this law directly promotes election fairness and would not likely
have a substantial negative impact on public discourse, it should be
assigned to the election domain. Nonetheless, the possibility of selective
enforcement by politically motivated officials puts the constitutionality of
such laws in doubt.
The Article concludes with the discussion of Minnesota Voters Alliance
v. Mansky, a Supreme Court decision issued shortly before this Article was
published. Significantly, in striking down a law prohibiting the wearing of
political badges, buttons, or insignias inside a polling place, the Court
eschews the All-Inclusive Approach and adopts instead a mode of analysis
functionally similar to the Domain-Allocation Approach suggested in this
Article.
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I. Regulations and Judicial Decisions
Laws in the United States regulating false speech in political campaigns
are not a new phenomenon, with the first such law dating to 1911.2 By
1975, seventeen states had such laws or regulations on the books,3 and by
2016 “[n]ineteen states [had] passed statutes prohibiting false campaign
speech in some form.”4 Despite the longstanding existence of such laws,
however, there have been few challenges to their constitutionality until the
last two decades.5
A. Relevant Supreme Court Cases
Although the Supreme Court has yet to issue an opinion discussing the
constitutionality of statutes prohibiting false campaign statements,6 it has
decided several cases that cast light on whether such laws comport with the
First Amendment.
1. Brown v. Hartlage
During a press conference, Carl Brown, a candidate for the office of
county commissioner in Jefferson County, Kentucky, criticized the office’s
salary as exorbitant.7 If elected, he promised to substantially reduce the
salary he would take.8 Upon learning shortly thereafter that this promise
might have violated the Kentucky Corrupt Practices Act, Brown
2. Mark Listes & Wendy Underhill, Campaign Fair Practice Laws (Is There a Right to
Lie?), NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Oct. 29, 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/
elections-and-campaigns/campaign-fair-practice-laws-is-there-a-right-to-lie.aspx.
3. Developments in the Law: Elections, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1111, 1273 (1975).
4. Jason Zenor, A Reckless Disregard for the Truth? The Constitutional Right to Lie in
Politics, 38 CAMP. L. REV. 41, 49 (2016).
5. Developments in the Law: Elections, supra note 3, at 1275 (referring to a “lack of
direct authority on the constitutionality of campaign falsity statutes”). The article cites but
two constitutional challenges. Id. at 1275–76 n.235. The cited cases are Vanasco v.
Schwartz, 56 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1974) (remanding a suit challenging the constitutionality of a
prohibition on false campaign statements for convocation of three-judge district court) and
Wilson v. Superior Court, 532 P.2d 116, 118 (Cal. 1975) (holding that an injunction against
republication of allegedly deceptive campaign literature was an unconstitutional prior
restraint of speech).
6. In 1976, the Court summarily affirmed the decision of a three-judge district court
striking down several provisions of a New York election code prohibiting false campaign
statements. Schwartz v. Postel, 423 U.S. 1041 (1976). The decision of the lower court,
Vanasco v. Schwartz, 401 F. Supp. 87 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (three-judge court), is discussed in
detail below. See infra notes 107–39 and accompanying text.
7. Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 47–48 (1982).
8. Id.
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immediately retracted it.9 Despite the retraction, the Kentucky Court of
Appeals held that the promise invalidated the election, which Brown had
won.10 The United States Supreme Court unanimously held that imposing
such a penalty on Brown’s speech violated the First Amendment.11
Writing for the majority, Justice William Brennan readily acknowledged
that the states have a legitimate interest “in preserving the integrity of their
electoral processes.”12 Brennan emphasized, however, that because “the
First Amendment was fashioned to assure the unfettered interchange of
ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the
people,” it “has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the
conduct of campaigns for political office.”13 Accordingly, if “a State seeks
to restrict directly the offer of ideas by a candidate to the voters, the First
Amendment surely requires that the restriction be demonstrably supported
by not only a legitimate state interest, but a compelling one.”14
Brennan perceived “three bases upon which the application of the
[Corrupt Practices Act] to Brown’s promise might . . . be justified.”15 The
first was a prohibition on buying votes.16 Brennan found, however, that
because “Brown did not offer some private payment or donation in
exchange for voter support,” his promise to reduce his salary, like a promise
to lower taxes, “cannot be deemed beyond the reach of the First
Amendment, or considered as inviting the kind of corrupt arrangement the
appearance of which a State may have a compelling interest in avoiding.”17
The second rationale was the concern that “emphasis on free public
service might result in persons of independent wealth but less ability being
chosen over those who, though better qualified, could not afford to serve at
a reduced salary.”18 But even though this may be a legitimate interest,
Brennan explained, “[t]he State’s fear that voters might make an ill-advised
choice does not provide the State with a compelling justification for
limiting speech.”19

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at 48.
Id. at 50.
Id. at 61–62.
Id. at 52.
Id. at 53 (quoting Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 271–72 (1971)).
Id. at 53–54.
Id. at 54.
Id.
Id. at 58.
Id. at 59.
Id. at 60.
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Finally, and particularly relevant to our inquiry, the sanction on Brown’s
speech was defended as a restriction on the making of false statements.20
Since the salary for the office for which Brown ran was set by law, he
would not have been able to deliver on his promise.21 Brennan
acknowledged that “[o]f course, demonstrable falsehoods are not protected
by the First Amendment in the same manner as truthful statements.”22
“But,” he continued, “erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate,
and . . . it must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the
‘breathing space’ that they ‘need . . . to survive.’”23 Because the Kentucky
law could result in an election victory being overturned even if “the
offending statement was made in good faith and was quickly repudiated,”
the law did not afford the “requisite ‘breathing space.’”24 Brennan
concluded his opinion for the Court by observing that in a political
campaign an inaccurate factual statement by a candidate is “unlikely to
escape the notice of, and correction by, the erring candidate’s political
opponent.”25 For this reason, in this context “[t]he preferred First
Amendment remedy of ‘more speech, not enforced silence,’” has “special
force.”26
Reflecting what may well have been the Court’s uncertainty on the
subject, Brown sent mixed signals about whether it would be constitutional
to prohibit knowing falsehoods by candidates for elective office. On the one
hand, emphasizing that “[a] candidate, no less than any other person, has a
First Amendment right to engage in the discussion of public issues,”
Brennan’s majority opinion subjected the application of the restriction
imposed on Brown’s speech to strict scrutiny.27 On the other hand, despite
the “strict scrutiny” verbiage, the opinion acknowledged that some forms of
electoral speech, including “some kinds of promises made by a candidate to
voters, and some kinds of promises elicited by voters from candidates, may
20. Id. at 61.
21. Id. at 60.
22. Id. (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974)).
23. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271–
72 (1964)).
24. Id. at 61.
25. Id.
26. Id. (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring)). Chief Justice Earl Warren concurred in the judgment. Id. at 62 (Warren, C.J.,
concurring). Justice William Rehnquist concurred in the result only, noting that “on different
facts I think I would give more weight to the State’s interest in preventing corruption in
elections.” Id. (Rehnquist, J., concurring in result).
27. Id. at 53 (majority opinion) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 421 U.S. 1, 52–53 (1976)).
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be declared illegal without constitutional difficulty.”28 While the Court
found that the Kentucky law provided inadequate “breathing space” for
factual misstatements made in good faith in a political campaign, it
emphasized that there had been no showing that Brown “made the disputed
statement other than in good faith and without knowledge of its falsity, or
that he made the statement with reckless disregard as to whether it was false
or not.”29 This qualification seems to leave open the possibility that
falsehoods made with such “actual malice” might be sanctionable.
2. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission
Margaret McIntyre distributed leaflets opposing a referendum on a
proposed school tax levy, violating a provision of Ohio’s Election Code
requiring campaign material to identify the person or organization
responsible for its publication.30 The Ohio Elections Commission fined
McIntyre $100.31 By a vote of seven to two, the Supreme Court invalidated
this provision as violating the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of
speech.32 Finding that the law imposed a content-based restriction
burdening “core political speech,” Justice John Paul Stevens’s majority
opinion subjected the law to “exacting scrutiny.”33 Stevens summarily
rejected the state’s argument that its interest in supplying the electorate with
pertinent information was compelling enough to justify the ban on
anonymous campaign speech.34 In his view, the identity of the speaker was
no different than other information the author of the material might choose
to omit.35
In contrast—and relevant to our inquiry about the constitutionality of
restrictions on campaign lies—Stevens observed that “the state interest in
preventing fraud and libel stands on a different footing.”36 Stevens noted
that this interest “carries special weight during election campaigns” because
“false statements, if credited, may have serious adverse consequences for
the public at large.”37 He then explained that the “principal weapon against

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 55.
Id. at 61.
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 337–38 (1995).
Id.
Id. at 336, 357.
Id. at 347.
Id. at 348–49.
Id.
Id. at 349.
Id.
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fraud”38 was not the challenged ban on anonymous campaign material;
rather, the remedy lay in other provisions of the Ohio Election Code
providing “detailed and specific prohibitions against making or
disseminating false statements during political campaigns.”39 After quoting
these provisions, however, Stevens explicitly reserved judgment about their
conformity with the First Amendment:
We need not, of course, evaluate the constitutionality of the
provisions. We quote them merely to emphasize that Ohio has
addressed directly the problem of election fraud. To the extent
that the anonymity ban indirectly seeks to vindicate the same
goals, it is merely a supplement to the above provisions.40
Because the “ancillary benefits” provided by the ban on anonymous
campaign speech could not justify such “extremely broad prohibition,” the
Court invalidated the anonymity ban.41
Justice Antonin Scalia’s dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice
William Rehnquist, would have upheld the anonymity ban in light of the
“widespread and longstanding” American practice of banning anonymous
campaign speech.42 Scalia also accused the majority of significantly
underestimating the role that the ban on anonymous campaign speech
played in promoting Ohio’s various prohibitions of campaign lies.43 Like
the majority, Scalia did not express a view about the constitutionality of
Ohio’s ban on false campaign speech. Significantly, however, he observed
that “protection of the election process justifies limitations upon speech that
cannot be imposed generally” and emphasized that “no justification for
regulation is more compelling than protection of the electoral process.”44 It
38. Id. at 350.
39. Id. at 349.
40. Id. at 350 n.12. Stevens readily acknowledged that “ancillary benefits” provided by
the ban on anonymous campaign speech were “assuredly legitimate” in that it deterred “the
making of false statements by unscrupulous prevaricators.” Id. at 351. Of course, that an
interest may be legitimate does not mean that it is sufficiently compelling to satisfy strict
scrutiny.
41. Id. at 351.
42. Id. at 375 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
43. Scalia observed that “the distributor of a leaflet which is unlawful because it is
anonymous runs much more risk of immediate detection and punishment than the distributor
of a leaflet which is unlawful because it is false.” Id. at 382. For that reason, Scalia reasoned,
it is more likely that people will obey a “signing requirement than a naked ‘no falsity’
requirement.” Id. Having thus identified themselves, Scalia continued, people will “be
significantly less likely to lie in what they have signed.” Id.
44. Id. at 378–79.
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might be fairly inferred, therefore, that, consistent with their view that the
anonymity ban was constitutional, the dissenting justices would have found
the bans on campaign lies constitutional as well.
3. United States v. Alvarez
Brown and McIntyre dealt directly with the First Amendment’s
protection of campaign speech but touched only tangentially on lies.
Conversely, United States v. Alvarez focused directly and comprehensively
on the First Amendment’s protection of lies generally45 but addressed
campaign lies only briefly and inconclusively in a concurring opinion.46
When introducing himself as a board member of a water district, Xavier
Alvarez falsely claimed that he held the Congressional Medal of Honor.47
For telling this lie, Alvarez was convicted under the Stolen Valor Act,
which criminalized falsely claiming that one had been awarded a military
honor.48 In a six to three decision, the Court invalidated the Act on First
Amendment grounds.49 A plurality opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy,
joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and
Sonia Sotomayor, began by stating that “content-based restrictions on
speech have been permitted, as a general matter, only when confined to the
few historic and traditional categories of expression long familiar to the
bar.”50 Kennedy then observed that “[a]bsent from these few categories
where the law allows content-based regulation of speech is any general
exception to the First Amendment for false statements.”51 Particularly
pertinent to our inquiry, Kennedy stated that even knowing falsehoods or
falsehoods made with reckless disregard for their truth are not among those
few categories of expression that may be regulated because of their content
consistent with the First Amendment.52 Accordingly, Kennedy subjected
the law to “the most exacting scrutiny.”53
Kennedy acknowledged that the government had a “compelling interest”
in protecting “the integrity of the military honors system in general, and the

45. 567 U.S. 709 (2012).
46. Id. at 738–39 (Breyer, J., concurring).
47. Id. at 713 (plurality opinion).
48. Id. at 713, 715.
49. Id. at 715.
50. Id. at 718 (quoting United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 469 (2010)). For the
exceptions listed in this opinion, see infra note 277 and accompanying text.
51. Id. at 718.
52. Id. at 718–19.
53. Id. at 724.
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Congressional Medal of Honor in particular.”54 He found, however, that the
restriction on speech imposed by the Act was not “actually necessary” to
achieve these interests because the government had “not shown, and cannot
show, why counterspeech would not suffice to achieve its interest.”55 In
addition, Kennedy observed that because the government could provide a
database listing the Congressional Medal of Honor winners, the speech
restriction was not the “least restrictive means among available, effective
alternatives.”56 For these reasons, he concluded that the Act did not pass the
“exacting scrutiny” to which content-based speech restrictions are subject.57
Concurring in the result, Justice Stephen Breyer, joined by Justice Elena
Kagan, agreed that the Act was unconstitutional.58 Breyer noted that
“restricting false statements about philosophy, religion, history, the social
sciences, the arts, and the like” present a grave danger of suppressing
truthful speech and, therefore, such restrictions should be subject to strict
scrutiny.59 But because this case did not involve such a law, but rather one
that prohibits “false statements about easily verifiable facts that do not
concern such subject matter,” such exacting scrutiny was inappropriate.60
Recognizing that the Act might nonetheless threaten free speech, he
subjected it to “intermediate scrutiny.”61 Finding that the Act “applies in
family, social, or other private contexts, where lies will often cause little
harm,”62 as well as in “political contexts, where although such lies are more
likely to cause harm, the risk of censorious selectivity by prosecutors is also
high,”63 he concluded that the Act was not sufficiently “narrowly
tailored.”64 Breyer suggested, however, that a more “finely tailored” statute
might be constitutional, for instance, one that “focus[ed] its coverage on
lies most likely to be harmful or on contexts where such lies are most likely
to cause harm.”65

54. Id. at 724–25.
55. Id. at 726.
56. Id. at 729 (quoting Ashcroft v. Am. Civ. Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656, 666
(2004)).
57. Id. at 729–30.
58. Id. at 730 (Breyer, J., concurring).
59. Id. at 731–32.
60. Id. at 732.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 736.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 737.
65. Id. at 738.
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In discussing the narrow tailoring requirement, Breyer had this to say
about regulation of false electoral speech:
I recognize that in some contexts, particularly political contexts,
such a narrowing will not always be easy to achieve. In the
political arena a false statement is more likely to make a
behavioral difference (say, by leading the listeners to vote for the
speaker), but at the same time criminal prosecution is
particularly dangerous (say, by radically changing a potential
election result) and consequently can more easily result in
censorship of speakers and their ideas. Thus, the statute may
have to be significantly narrowed in its applications. Some lower
courts have upheld the constitutionality of roughly comparable
but narrowly tailored statutes in political contexts. Without
expressing any view on the validity of those cases, I would also
note, like the plurality, that in this area more accurate
information will normally counteract the lie.66
Justice Samuel Alito, joined by Justices Scalia and Clarence Thomas,
dissented.67 Noting the many occasions in which the Court had stated that
“false statements of fact do not merit First Amendment protection for their
own sake,”68 Alito observed that the Court had also “recognized that it is
sometimes necessary to ‘exten[d] a measure of strategic protection’ to these
statements in order to ensure sufficient ‘breathing space’ for protected
speech.”69 In Alito’s view, however, “the Stolen Valor Act presents no risk
at all that valuable speech will be suppressed.”70 He explained that the
Stolen Valor Act stands in “stark contrast to . . . laws prohibiting false
statements about history, science, and similar matters.”71 This is because,
unlike the Stolen Valor Act, laws prohibiting false statements about
“matters of public concern” would present a “grave and unacceptable
danger of suppressing truthful speech.”72

66. Id. (citations omitted).
67. Id. at 739 (Alito, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 750.
69. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342
(1974)).
70. Id. at 752. Nor in Alito’s judgment was the Act subject to facial invalidity on
overbreadth grounds because of its potential application to private or political speech. In his
view, there was no showing that the Act was substantially overbroad. Id. at 753.
71. Id. at 752.
72. Id. at 751.
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So what does Alvarez tell us about the constitutionality of regulating lies
in political campaigns? It reveals that after thirty years and a complete
change of membership since Brown v. Hartlage, the Court is still unsure
about the constitutionality of laws prohibiting lies in political campaigns.
Breyer’s opinion is the only one that directly addresses this issue—and it
expressly reserves judgment.73 Significantly, however, Breyer distinguishes
between false statements about “philosophy, religion, history, the social
sciences, the arts, and the like” and false statements in “political speech,”
by which he seems to mean speech in political campaigns.74 With respect to
laws restricting lies in the former category, he would apply “strict scrutiny,”
which he acknowledges “warrants . . . near-automatic condemnation” of a
law.75 In contrast, he apparently would subject restrictions on false
statements in electoral contexts to “intermediate scrutiny”—albeit a
particularly searching version of such scrutiny in light of the “risk of
censorious selectivity by prosecutors.”76 It is also manifest that the
government would bear the burden of showing why counterspeech would
be an insufficient remedy.
Alito’s dissenting opinion similarly appears to hive off false statements
in political campaigns from other forms of false statements on matters of
public concern. Thus, Alito states that “any attempt” by government to
restrict “false statements about philosophy, religion, history, the social
sciences, the arts, and other matters of public concern” would “present a
grave and unacceptable danger of suppressing truthful speech.”77
Noticeably missing from this litany are false statements in political
campaigns. Indeed, the only mention in Alito’s opinion of campaign speech
is in a citation to Brown in support of the argument that “false statements of
fact do not merit First Amendment protection for their own sake,” but “it is
sometimes necessary to extend a measure of strategic protection to [false]
statements in order to ensure sufficient ‘breathing space’ for protected
speech.”78 As detailed below, the basic thesis of this Article is that, with

73. Id. at 738–39 (Breyer, J., concurring).
74. Id. at 731.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 736.
77. Id. at 751 (Alito, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
78. Id. at 750–51 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974)). The
parenthetical following the citation to Brown describes the case as “sustaining as-applied
First Amendment challenge to law prohibiting certain ‘factual misstatements in the course of
political debate’ where there had been no showing that the disputed statement was made
‘other than in good faith and without knowledge of its falsity, or . . . with reckless disregard
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respect to the applicable level of First Amendment scrutiny, campaign
speech should be distinguished from public discourse. So it is significant
that, like Breyer’s concurring opinion, Alito’s dissent leaves open the
possibility that government may have somewhat greater authority to
prohibit at least some form of campaign lies than it does to punish
knowingly false statements about “history, science, and similar matters.”
In contrast, Kennedy’s plurality opinion would seem implicitly to take a
harder line against laws prohibiting campaign lies, which manifestly
regulate speech based on its content. Since, in the plurality’s view, there is
no categorical exemption from the rule against content discrimination, even
for intentional or reckless misstatement of fact, any prohibition on
campaign lies would seem to be subject to strict scrutiny and, thus, “nearautomatic” condemnation.
There are, however, plausible arguments that, even under the plurality’s
approach, prohibitions on at least some campaign lies might evade such
scrutiny. First is the argument advanced by Professor Eugene Volokh:
because lies by candidates are lies by people “seeking a paying job,” such
expression is a species of financial fraud, a category of speech the plurality
recognized as categorically without First Amendment protection.79 Another
such argument arises from the statement in the plurality opinion confirming
the constitutionality of laws punishing false statements made to law
enforcement officials, perjury, and false representations that one is speaking
on behalf of government.80 Significantly, these types of expression are not
(or, at least, not as such)81 on the plurality’s list of categories of expression
exempt from the rule against content discrimination. It is understandable
that the plurality did not want to imply that laws punishing lies that threaten
the “integrity of Government processes” are “vulnerable” to First
Amendment challenge.82 But the plurality’s recognition that these types of
as to whether it was false or not.’” Id. at 751 (quoting Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 61
(1982)).
79. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Knowing Falsehoods, VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (June 28, 2012, 5:19 PM), http://volokh.com/2012/06/28/freedom-of-speechand-knowing-falsehoods/.
80. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 720 (plurality opinion).
81. The plurality suggests that some of this expression might “implicate fraud or speech
integral to criminal conduct.” Id. at 721. As Eugene Volokh has aptly noted, the “speech
integral to criminal conduct” exception is “indeterminate, dangerous, and inconsistent with
more recent cases.” Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal
Courses of Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utterances,” and the Uncharted Zones, 90
CORNELL L. REV. 1277, 1285 (2005).
82. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 721.
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lies may constitutionally be proscribed because they interfere with the
integrity of essential government functions invites the argument that certain
types of electoral lies may similarly be banned consistent with the First
Amendment because they undermine the integrity of elections, another
essential government function.
4. Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus
Nearly two decades after its decision in McIntyre, the Supreme Court
once again had occasion to discuss Ohio’s ban on false campaign speech in
a decision finding that an advocacy group had standing to challenge the
law.83 Although the Court again did not expressly comment on the law’s
constitutionality, the decision nevertheless strongly suggests that the law is
constitutionally defective.
The Susan B. Anthony List (SBA), a “pro-life advocacy organization,”
publicly criticized various members of Congress—including thenCongressman Steve Driehaus, who voted for the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (ACA)—as supporting taxpayer-funded abortion.84 In
addition to criticizing his vote in a press release, the SBA planned to do so
on a billboard that would have read: “Shame on Steve Driehaus! Driehaus
voted FOR taxpayer-funded abortion.”85 After Driehaus’s counsel
threatened legal action, however, the owner of the billboard space refused
to display that message.86
Driehaus filed a complaint with the Ohio Elections Commission alleging
that the claim that he voted for “taxpayer-funded abortion” was a false
statement in violation of the Ohio’s false statement statute.87 A Commission
panel voted two to one that probable cause existed that a violation had been
committed and set a hearing before the full commission for ten business
days later. The SBA then filed suit in federal district court seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that the provision of the Election
Code under which Driehaus brought his complaint violated the First
Amendment.88 The district court stayed the lawsuit pending completion of

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334 (2014).
Id. at 2339.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Commission proceedings.89 The parties then agreed to postpone the full
Commission hearing until after the election.90
After Driehaus lost the election, he withdrew his complaint, and the
district court lifted the stay.91 The district court consolidated the SBA’s suit
with a separate suit brought by another advocacy organization, the
Coalition Opposed to Additional Spending and Taxes (COAST).92 COAST
also wanted to distribute material criticizing Driehaus as voting “to fund
abortions with tax dollars,” but was deterred from doing so because of the
complaint against the SBA.93 In light of Driehaus’s dropping his complaint
against the SBA, the district court dismissed both suits as non-justiciable,
finding that neither sufficiently alleged concrete injury for purposes of
standing and ripeness.94 The Sixth Circuit affirmed on ripeness grounds.95
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Thomas held that the advocacy
groups’ pre-enforcement challenge to Ohio’s false statement statute was
justiciable because the groups had alleged sufficiently imminent injury.96
While the opinion focused on the injury-in-fact requirement for Article III
standing,97 Thomas made several observations that are arguably relevant to
the merits of both the Ohio false statement statute and similar provisions in
other states. First, in considering whether the challenged law arguably
proscribed conduct in which the advocacy organizations wanted to engage,
Thomas observed that the “Ohio false statement law sweeps broadly.”98
Relatedly, he firmly rejected the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning concerning
whether further prosecution of the SBA was likely. The lower court had
held that, because the statute proscribes only knowingly false statements
and the SBA had not claimed that it “plan[ned] to lie or recklessly disregard
the veracity of its speech,”99 the possibility of prosecution for statements
the SBA claimed were truthful was “exceedingly slim.”100 Thomas
observed that, despite the SBA’s insistence that its claims about Driehaus

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id.
Id. at 2340.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2343.
Id. at 2341–46.
Id. at 2344.
Id.
Id.
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were true, a Commission panel had previously found probable cause that
the SBA’s statements had violated the law.101
It is a fair inference from these observations that the Court was
concerned about the wide variety of expression within the scope of the Ohio
law’s prohibition, a worry not cured by the law’s application only to
knowingly or recklessly false speech. But it is the section of the opinion
documenting the substantiality of “the threat of future enforcement of the
false statement statute”102 that provides the most insight into how the Court
might rule on the merits of Ohio’s false statement law or a similar
prohibition on campaign lies.
Thomas explained that the threat of future enforcement arising from the
prosecution of the SBA “is bolstered by the fact that authority to file a
complaint with the Commission is not limited to a prosecutor or any
agency” constrained by “explicit guidelines or ethical obligations.”103
Rather, under the Ohio false statement law “‘any person’ with knowledge
of the purported violation” can file a complaint.104 Citing an amicus brief
filed by Ohio’s attorney general, Thomas found that there is “a real risk”
that complaints will be filed by political opponents, who will thereby “gain
a campaign advantage without ever having to prove the falsity of a
statement.”105 He explained:
[C]omplainants may time their submissions to achieve maximum
disruption of their political opponents while calculating that an
ultimate decision on the merits will be deferred until after the
relevant election. Moreover, the target of a false statement
complaint may be forced to divert significant time and resources
to hire legal counsel and respond to discovery requests in the
crucial days leading up to an election. And where, as here, a
Commission panel issues a preelection probable-cause finding,
such a determination itself may be viewed [by the electorate] as
a sanction by the State.106
It is always risky to make a prediction about how the Court will rule on
the constitutionality of a law based on comments not focusing on the law’s
merits. Still, in light of the concerns about the practical operation of Ohio’s
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 2344–45.
Id. at 2345.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2345–46.
Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
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false statement law expressed in an opinion for the entire Court, I will go
out on a limb and make the following prediction: while the Court may
remain uncertain about the constitutionality of a narrowly focused
prohibition on electoral lies that contains adequate procedural safeguards, it
would likely invalidate any broad restriction on campaign speech that
allows anyone to file a complaint. Indeed, in striking down laws similar to
Ohio’s ban on false campaign statements, several lower courts have relied
extensively on the Court’s opinion in SBA List.
B. Lower Court Rulings on the Constitutionality of Laws Prohibiting False
Campaign Speech
1. Vanasco v. Schwartz
Vanasco v. Schwartz,107 decided in 1975, is apparently the first reported
case to directly rule on the constitutionality of a law prohibiting campaign
lies.108 In 1974, pursuant to a recently enacted New York Election Law, the
New York State Board of Elections (“the Board”) promulgated a Fair
Campaign Code (“the Code”).109 At issue in the case were three provisions
of the Code: section 6201.1(d), prohibiting “misrepresentation of any
candidate’s qualifications,” including “personal vilification” and “scurrilous
attacks”;110 section 6201.1(e), forbidding “misrepresentation of any
candidate’s position”;111 and section 6201.1(f), banning “misrepresentation

107. 401 F. Supp. 87 (S.D.N.Y. & E.D.N.Y. 1975).
108. A comprehensive law review article written in 1975 mentions no case involving a
challenge to the constitutionality of a law regulating false campaign statements other than
the then-undecided Vanasco suit. See Developments in the Law: Elections, supra note 3, at
1275–76 n.235; cf. Wilson v. Superior Court, 532 P.2d 116, 122–23 (Cal. 1975) (holding
injunction against republication of allegedly deceptive campaign literature an
unconstitutional prior restraint of speech). There were earlier reported cases involving laws
regulating false campaign statements but none that I have been able to find involved
constitutional challenges to the law. See, e.g., Effertz v. Schimelpfenig, 291 N.W. 286, 288
(Minn. 1940) (refusing to void an election under Minnesota’s Corrupt Practices Act because
the plaintiff failed to prove his opponent’s lies were “material”); State ex rel. Hampel v.
Mitten, 278 N.W. 431, 436 (Wis. 1938) (refusing to void election because candidate’s
campaign statements about his opponent’s “moral character” were not susceptible to being
proven true or false).
109. The Code was codified at N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6201.1 (McKinney 1974). See
Vanasco, 401 F. Supp. at 88 n.1.
110. Vanasco, 401 F. Supp. at 88 (quoting N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6201.1(d)).
111. Id. (quoting N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6201.1(e)).
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of a candidate’s party affiliation or party endorsement.”112 These
prohibitions applied “during the course of any campaign for nomination or
election to public office or party position” to misrepresentations made “by
means of campaign literature, media advertisements, or broadcasts, public
speeches, press releases, writings or otherwise.”113
The Code also established detailed procedures for filing complaints and
answers with the Board and for conducting hearings before the Board. The
Board was empowered to impose a fine of up to $1000 for each violation;
to issue a report setting forth its findings; and to institute judicial
proceedings to enforce its orders,114 including seeking an injunction against
violation of its orders.115
The plaintiffs in this case—Roy Vanasco, Joseph Ferris, and Robert
Postel—were candidates in the 1974 election for the New York State
Assembly; each had been sanctioned by the Board for violating the Code.116
The Board had found that since Vanasco was not the candidate of the
Liberal Party, his use of the phrase “Republican-Liberal” on his campaign
literature misrepresented his party endorsement in violation of section
6201.1(f) of the Code.117 It found that Ferris misrepresented his opponent’s
voting record in violation of section 6201.1(e) of the Code.118
112. Id. (quoting N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6201.1(f)). Also involved in this case was a
provision prohibiting “attacks on a candidate based on race, sex, religion or ethnic
background.” Id. (quoting N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6201.1(c)).
113. Id. (quoting N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6201.1). The court noted that while the Code refers
to “misrepresentation,” the New York election law authorizing the Code refers to “deliberate
misrepresentations.” Id. at 88 n.2.
114. Id. at 99.
115. Id. at 89 n.5.
116. Id. at 89–91.
117. Id. at 89. Vanasco argued to the Board that, although he had failed to get enough
signatures on his nominating petition to be listed on the ballot as the Liberal Party candidate,
he reasonably and in good faith believed he had the endorsement of that party. Id. at 89 n.3.
But the Board concluded that, while members of the Liberal Party may have promoted
Vanasco’s candidacy, he was not in fact the candidate of the Liberal Party, and, thus, his use
of the phrase “Republican-Liberal” on his campaign literature misrepresented his party
affiliation. Id.
118. Id. at 90. Ferris claimed in a leaflet that his incumbent opponent, Vincent Riccio,
“voted himself a $17,000 salary increase; received his salary for less than 100 days work;
opposed increased funds for recreation for the aging and opposed aid to community
colleges.” Id. at 89. A newspaper also quoted Ferris as stating that Riccio voted for
gerrymandering the District he represented in the State Assembly. Id. at 89 n.6. In response
to Riccio’s complaint filed with the Board, Ferris alleged that “(1) Riccio did vote for a
salary increase but it did not become effective until January 1975; (2) that the New York
State Assembly is in session less than 100 days a year; (3) Riccio had opposed a bill (other
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Both of these candidates complied with the Board’s order to surrender
the offending campaign literature or submit a plan for “re-marking” the
literature.119 Shortly before these orders issued, however, they sued the
Board in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York; these plaintiffs sought to convene a three-judge court for the
purposes of declaring the statute and the Code unconstitutional (both on
their face and as applied) and enjoining the enforcement of the statute and
the Code.120 The district court dismissed the complaint.121 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, however, reversed the district
court and ordered that a three-judge court be convened.122
Postel’s case was heard by the same three-judge court.123 Postel was
accused by his opponent, A. B. “Pete” Grannis, of making false
representations about him.124 The Board issued an interim order requiring
Postel to cease and desist from distributing any literature containing the
language about which Grannis had complained.125 Before the hearing could
be completed, however, Postel obtained a temporary restraining order from
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
against further proceedings by the Board.126 The Court of Appeals then

than the one he supported) dealing with increased funds for recreation of the aging; and (4)
Riccio had voted in favor of budgets which had the effect of reducing aid to community
colleges.” Id. With respect to Ferris’s statement to the press, Riccio claimed that he voted
against gerrymandering, but Ferris countered that he was referring to an earlier vote. Id. The
Board found that Ferris had misrepresented Riccio’s voting record and did so “with actual
knowledge of its falsity and with reckless disregard of its falsity.” Id. at 90 n.7.
119. Id. at 89, 90.
120. Id. at 90.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 91.
124. Id. at 90. As recounted by the court:
Specifically, Grannis charged that certain Postel campaign literature
misrepresented that Grannis had a ‘patronage job’ in the State Department of
Environmental Conservation; received major financial support from
Republican ‘big whigs’ such as Laurence Rockefeller and Henry Diamond; that
the New York Court of Appeals had directed a new election after having
adduced proof that a number of Republicans had voted illegally in a
Democratic primary; that a complaint against Grannis had been filed with the
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights and that Grannis was a registered Republican
in 1973.
Id.
125. Id. at 91.
126. Id.
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ordered the three-judge court convened to hear Vanasco’s and Ferris’s
claims to consider Postel’s case as well.127
The three-judge district court, in an opinion by Judge Henry F. Werker,
began its constitutional analysis by declaring that the “regulation of the
speech of ‘public officers’ and ‘public figures’ during campaigns for
political office [is] where the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech
‘has its fullest and most urgent application.’”128 Nonetheless, it agreed with
the Board that “calculated falsehoods are of such slight social value that no
matter what the context in which they are made, they are not
constitutionally protected.”129 At the same time, the court emphasized that it
must “bear in mind the necessity for legislators to use only the most
‘sensitive tools’ in separating legitimate from illegitimate speech so that
First Amendment freedoms are given the necessary ‘breathing space’ they
need to survive.”130 Finding that the challenged provisions of the Code
“cast a substantial chill on the expression of protected speech,” the court
held these provisions “unconstitutionally overbroad and vague on their
face.”131
With respect to section 6201.1(d), the court observed that the prohibition
on “misrepresentation of any candidate’s qualifications” expressly included
“‘personal vilification’ and ‘scurrilous attacks.’”132 The court held that
while such expression may be offensive, it does not “by that fact alone . . .
lose its constitutional protection.”133 Similarly, with respect to section
6201.1(f), the court noted that the Board “merely found that [Vanasco] had
‘misrepresented’ his party endorsement” but did not made a finding that
“the misrepresentation was deliberate or that it was made with knowledge
of its falsity or reckless disregard of the truth.”134 This construction by the
Board “clearly demonstrated” that the provision at issue was “susceptible to
application to protected speech.”135 Finally, with respect to the prohibition
on “misrepresentation of a candidate’s position” imposed by section
6201.1(e), the court noted “the often difficult task of trying to define . . .
what a political candidate’s ‘position’ is on issues discussed during a
127. Id.
128. Id. at 93 (quoting Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971)).
129. Id.
130. Id. (first quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958) and then quoting
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
131. Id. at 95.
132. Id. at 96.
133. Id. (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 22–23 (1971)).
134. Id.
135. Id.
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campaign.”136 As a result, “the term ‘misrepresentation’ could be applied to
almost all campaign speech,” thereby “chilling” speech protected by the
First Amendment.137
The court concluded by recognizing the “state’s legitimate interest in
insuring fair and honest elections” and conceded that “deliberate calculated
falsehoods when used by political candidates can lead to public cynicism
and apathy.”138 But due to the “irresistible force of protected expression
under the First Amendment,” even the important state interest of assuring
fair and honest elections does not justify the state in “tamper[ing] with what
it will permit the citizen to see and hear.”139 Three years later, another court
would uphold a narrower ban on the making of false campaign statements.
2. DeWine v. Ohio Elections Commission
DeWine v. Ohio Elections Commission, a 1978 decision by the Ohio
Court of Appeals, involved a facial challenge to an Ohio law that made it a
misdemeanor to “[p]ost, publish, circulate, or distribute a written or printed
false statement knowing the same to be false concerning a candidate that is
designed to promote the election, nomination, or defeat of the candidate.”140
The challenger was R. Michael DeWine,141 a successful candidate in a 1976
election for county prosecutor.142 The Ohio Elections Commission
determined that statistics DeWine used in his campaign brochure about the
prosecutorial record of the incumbent prosecutor he defeated were a
“misleading representation” of his opponent’s record in violation of the
Ohio law.143 Finding that the false statement statute implicated the
fundamental right of free speech, the court, in an opinion by Judge Alba L.

136. Id. at 97.
137. Id. In addition to striking down these three provisions prohibiting
misrepresentations, the court also invalidated section 6201.1(c), the provision banning
attacks on a candidate based on race, sex, religion, or ethnic background. Id. at 94.
138. Id. at 100.
139. Id. The Supreme Court summarily affirmed this decision. See Schwartz v. Postel,
423 U.S. 1041 (1976).
140. DeWine v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 399 N.E.2d 99, 102 (Ohio Ct. App. 1978)
(quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 3599.091(B)(9) (West 1976)). The law at issue here was the
predecessor to the one at issue in SBA List. See Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S.
Ct. 2334, 2338 (2014).
141. This was the same person who more than thirty-five years later in his capacity as the
Attorney General of Ohio filed the amicus brief cited extensively by the United States
Supreme Court in SBA List. See SBA List, 134 S. Ct. at 2345–46.
142. DeWine, 399 N.E.2d. at 101.
143. Id.
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Whiteside, subjected the law to “close judicial scrutiny.”144 It held that there
was a “very compelling state interest to promote honesty in the election of
public officers.”145 In addition, the court ruled that freedom of speech “does
not include a right to purposely, with knowledge of its falsity, publish a
false statement about a candidate for public office.”146 For these reasons,
the court held that the statute was facially constitutional,147 allowing the
prosecution of DeWine to proceed.148 Twenty years would pass before there
would be another major decision on the constitutionality of campaign lies.
3. State ex rel. Public Disclosure Commission v. 119 Vote No!
Committee
In 1998, a divided Washington Supreme Court invalidated on its face a
law prohibiting anyone acting with “actual malice” from sponsoring
“political advertising that contains a false statement of fact.”149 The law
specified that a violation must be proven by “clear and convincing
144. Id. at 102.
145. Id. at 103.
146. Id.
147. Id. The court also found that the trial court erred in holding that the law required that
the Commission use a proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard rather than a preponderance
of the evidence standard to make a determination that a violation of the law had occurred. Id.
at 105.
148. Seven years later, relying heavily on DeWine, a different division of the court of
appeals upheld a conviction under this law. See State v. Davis, 499 N.E.2d 1255 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1985). Subsequently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, as had
the Ohio Supreme Court in DeWine, also rebuffed a facial challenge to the Ohio false
statements law. See Pestrak v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 926 F.2d 573, 577 (1991). In doing
so, the Sixth Circuit upheld the provision of the law empowering the Commission to
determine whether a challenged campaign allegation was true or not and to proclaim this
finding to the electorate. Id. at 579. (This “truth-determining” aspect of this case is discussed
in more detail infra notes 376–379 and accompanying text.) But while upholding this
provision, the court invalidated two key provisions of the law: 1) the provision empowering
the commission to issue fines, on the ground that the law did not require the relevant
findings to be made by “clear and convincing evidence”; and 2) the provision allowing for
cease-and-desist orders as authorizing unconstitutional prior restraints on speech. Pestrak,
926 F.2d at 578. Twenty-five years later, the Sixth Circuit facially invalidated an amended
version of Ohio’s false statements law. See Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 814 F.3d
466, 471 (6th Cir. 2016), discussed, infra notes 253–274 and accompanying text. Soon
thereafter, the Ohio Court of Appeals followed suit, finding the law facially invalid under
both the First Amendment and the Ohio Constitution. See Magda v. Ohio Elections
Comm’n, 2016-Ohio-5043, 58 N.E.3d 1188.
149. State ex rel. Pub. Disclosure Comm’n v. 119 Vote No! Comm., 957 P.2d 691, 693
n.2 (Wash. 1998).
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evidence.”150 The case arose when the state’s Public Disclosure
Commission filed charges against the 119 Vote No! Committee, its
executive director, and its treasurer for statements the Committee published
criticizing a ballot measure to legalize assisted suicide.151 The complaint
alleged that the Committee’s statements, which asserted that the ballot
measure included inadequate safeguards, contained materially false
statements of fact published with actual malice—“that is, with knowledge
that the statements . . . were false or in reckless disregard of whether the
statements were false.”152 The complaint prayed that the defendants be
fined up to $10,000 plus costs, attorney’s fees, and treble damages.153 The
trial court dismissed the complaint, finding that the advertisement did not
contain materially false statements, and awarded the Committee attorney’s
fees and costs.154 Despite the dismissal, the American Civil Liberties Union,
which had intervened in the case, sought a declaration that the statute was
facially invalid.155 The trial court declined to invalidate the law.156
On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court unanimously agreed that the
publication did not violate the statute.157 The Court was sharply divided,
however, about the validity of the law, holding five to four that the statute
was facially unconstitutional. Writing for himself and two other justices,
Justice Richard Sanders held that, because the law infringes protected
speech, it must be subject to “exacting scrutiny.”158 He rejected the state’s
“claimed compelling interest to shield the public from falsehoods during a
political campaign” as “patronizing and paternalistic.”159 In Sanders’s view,
this justification “assumes the people of this state are too ignorant or
disinterested to investigate, learn, and determine for themselves the truth or
falsity in political debate, and it is the proper role of the government itself
to fill the void.”160 He found that the state’s reliance on defamation law was
misplaced in that defamation law “is designed to protect the property of an
individual in his or her good name.”161 Sanders found the law more
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id.
Id. at 693.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 694.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 693, 699, 701.
Id. at 696–97.
Id. at 698.
Id. at 699.
Id. at 697.
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comparable to the Sedition Act of 1798’s attempt to suppress seditious
libel.162 Because the law could not be justified by a compelling state interest
and because it chilled political speech, Sanders concluded the law was
unconstitutional on its face.163
Justice Barbara Madsen, joined by one other justice, agreed that the law
was facially unconstitutional because it included speech about a ballot
measure.164 Madsen wrote separately, however, to emphasize that she was
not convinced that a law prohibiting knowing or reckless falsehoods about
a candidate would violate the First Amendment.165
Justice Richard Guy, speaking for himself and one other justice,
disagreed that the law was facially unconstitutional.166 Because in his view
“[c]alculated lies are not protected political speech,” and because such lies
“do not foster debate; they foster deception,” he disagreed with the majority
that the law on its face violated the First Amendment.167
Justice Phil Talmadge, joined by one other justice, vehemently disagreed
with the majority’s conclusion that the law was facially unconstitutional.168
Condemning the majority for being the “first court in the history of the
Republic to declare First Amendment protection for calculated lies,” he
feared that the “sweep of the majority’s rhetoric is so encompassing that no
statute designed to ensure statements of fact in political campaigns are
truthful would survive a First Amendment challenge.”169 Relying on United
States Supreme Court dicta that deliberate falsehoods are not protected
speech,170 Talmadge disagreed with the majority that regulation of
campaign lies need be justified by a compelling state interest.171 In any
event, in his view, “ensuring the integrity of the electoral process, for ballot
measures as well as for election of candidates,” constitutes a compelling
state interest.172 In addition, he found that the “chilling effect of the statute
on free speech is infinitesimal, if it exists at all,” in that it does not reach
“hyperbole or rhetoric [or] polemic” but only “the calculating liar.”173
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id. at 696.
Id. at 699.
Id. (Madsen, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. (Guy, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 701 (Talmadge, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 703–04.
Id. at 707.
Id. at 708.
Id. at 707.
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In light of Madsen’s concurring opinion, in 1999 the Washington
legislature amended the statute to apply only to “a false statement of
material fact about a candidate for public office,” excluding statements that
a candidate or the candidate’s agent makes about himself or herself.174 The
amended law, however, was also invalidated on its face by a sharply
divided Washington Supreme Court.
4. Rickert v. State ex rel. Public Disclosure Commission
The validity of the amended law came before the Washington Supreme
Court in 2007 after a candidate for the Washington State Senate published a
campaign brochure charging that her opponent, the incumbent, had voted to
close a facility for the developmentally disabled.175 The Public Disclosure
Commission found that this charge was false in that the facility was not for
the developmentally disabled and that the incumbent had not voted to close
the facility.176 Finding that the statement was made with “actual malice,”
the Commission imposed a penalty of $1000 on the candidate.177
A plurality opinion by Justice James Johnson joined by three other
justices (including Justice Sanders) expressed basically the same views as
Sanders’s opinion in 119 Vote No! Committee. Quoting from that case,
Johnson wrote that the claim that the state “may prohibit false statement of
fact in political advertisements . . . presupposes the State possesses an
independent right to determine truth and falsity in political debate,” a
proposition that Johnson found “fundamentally at odds with the principles
embodied in the First Amendment.”178 In addition, he found this claim
“naively assumes that the government is capable of correctly and
consistently negotiating the thin line between fact and opinion in political
speech,” when “political speech is usually as much opinion as fact.”179 For
this reason, “every person must be his own watchman for truth, because the
forefathers did not trust any government to separate the truth from the false
for us.”180

174. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.17.530(1)(a) (1999) (currently codified at WASH REV. CODE
§ 42.17A.335 (2012)).
175. Rickert v. State ex rel. Pub. Disclosure Comm’n, 168 P.3d 826, 827 (Wash. 2007).
176. Id. at 828.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 829.
179. Id.
180. Id. (quoting State ex rel. Pub. Disclosure Comm’n v. 119 Vote No! Comm., 957
P.2d 691, 695 (1998)).
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Because the law was a content-based restriction on political speech,
Johnson subjected it to strict scrutiny.181 He found that the stated purpose of
the law—“to provide protection for candidates for public office” beyond the
reputational protection provided by defamation law—is not a compelling
state interest.182 He then turned to the interest in “preserving the integrity of
the election process.”183 Distinguishing content-based restrictions on speech
that the United States Supreme Court had upheld—measures “protecting
the election poll area” or “avoiding voter confusion by avoiding ballot
overcrowding by multiple candidates with little support”—Johnson found
that the prohibition on false factual statements about candidates did not
prevent “direct harm to elections.”184 In holding the law unconstitutional,
Johnson explained that the “election system already contains the solution to
the problem that [the law in question] is meant to address”: “[t]he preferred
First Amendment remedy of ‘more speech,’ not enforced silence.’”185
The deciding vote was cast by Chief Justice Gerry Alexander. In a brief
concurring opinion, he distanced himself from the plurality’s opinion,
which he read as concluding that “any government censorship of political
speech,” including prohibitions on defamation, “would run afoul of the First
Amendment.”186 But because the law at issue “prohibits nondefamatory
speech in addition to defamatory speech,” Alexander agreed that it was
overbroad and, thus, facially unconstitutional.187
Justice Madsen, joined by three other justices, dissented.188 Consistent
with her opinion in 119 Vote No! Committee, she found that deliberate
falsehoods about a candidate for public offices are not “protected
speech.”189 Accordingly, she found that a law proscribing such expression
181. Id.
182. Id. at 829–30. Johnson also found the law not “narrowly tailored” because of the
exemption of a candidate’s speech about himself or herself. Id. at 831.
183. Id. at 830.
184. Id. at 830–31.
185. Id. at 832 (quoting Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 61 (1982)). Johnson also found
that various “faulty procedural mechanisms,” including that members of the Commission are
appointed by the governor, “a political officer,” confirmed that the law was not narrowly
tailored. Id. at 831–32. Johnson acknowledged—but not without a warning that such
holdings “should be neither admired or emulated”—that some courts have upheld statutes
restricting false campaign speech. Id. at 827. The sole case cited by Johnson is Pestrak v.
Ohio Elections Commission, 926 F.2d 573 (6th Cir. 1991). Id. at 827 n.3. (Pestrak is
discussed infra notes 375–378 and accompanying text.)
186. Rickert, 168 P.3d at 832 (Alexander, C.J., concurring).
187. Id. at 833.
188. Id. (Madsen, J., dissenting).
189. Id. (stating that “the use of calculated falsehood is not constitutionally protected”).
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to protect the reputational interests of candidates comported with the First
Amendment.190 Madsen regarded the court’s decision as “an invitation to lie
with impunity,” adding that it is “little wonder that so many view political
campaigns with distrust and cynicism.”191
5. 281 Care Committee v. Arneson
281 Care Committee v. Arneson192—decided by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in 2014—was the first major decision on the
constitutionality of false campaign laws to be decided after United States v.
Alvarez. The case involved a challenge to a provision of the Minnesota Fair
Campaign Practices Act, under which it was a gross misdemeanor to make
a knowingly false statement about a ballot proposition.193 Pursuant to this
provision, anyone could lodge a complaint with the Minnesota Office of
Administrative Hearings (OAH), which could impose a civil penalty of up
to $5000.194 In addition, after the administrative proceedings were
complete, the complaint was subject to criminal prosecution by the county
attorney.195 The provision was challenged in federal district court on First
Amendment grounds by two advocacy organizations founded to oppose
school funding ballot initiatives.196 Finding that the law served the
compelling interests of preserving fair and honest elections and preventing
fraud upon the electorate, the district court rejected the challenge.197
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit, in an opinion by Judge C. Arlen Bean,
disagreed and held the statute unconstitutional.198 In light of Alvarez’s
teaching that “false statements do not represent a category of speech
altogether exempt from First Amendment protection”199 and because the
challenged provision was a content-based regulation of “political speech”
occupying “the core of the protection afforded by the First Amendment,”
the court subjected the law to strict scrutiny.200 In doing so, the court
pretermitted deciding whether “preserving fair and honest elections and
preventing fraud on the electorate” qualified as a compelling state
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Id. at 835.
Id. at 833.
766 F.3d 774 (8th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 777–78.
Id. at 778.
Id.
Id. at 777. The leaders of the organizations were also plaintiffs in this action. Id.
Id. at 779.
Id. at 795–96.
Id. at 783 (citing United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717 (2012)).
Id. at 784.
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interest.201 It instead focused on whether the provision was “narrowly
tailored,” concluding that it was not.202
To be narrowly tailored, the court explained, a regulation must: (1)
“actually advance” the compelling state interest; (2) be neither overinclusive nor under-inclusive; and (3) be the least-restrictive alternative.203
The court found that Minnesota’s false statement law failed each of these
requirements. With respect to the first requirement, the court faulted the
state for failing to adduce any empirical evidence that there are “actual,
serious threats of individuals disseminating knowingly false statements
concerning ballot initiatives.”204 More damningly, the court found that the
law did not actually advance the interest in preserving fair and honest
elections because the provision “tend[ed] to perpetuate the very fraud it is
allegedly designed to prohibit.”205
To support this conclusion, the court relied heavily on the Supreme
Court’s opinion in Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, which, in the court’s
view, “illuminated the many abuses that emanate” from prohibitions on
false campaign statements.206 It noted that, like the Ohio law at issue in SBA
List, “it is immensely problematic that anyone may lodge a complaint with
the OAH” alleging a violation of the Minnesota law.207 As a result, like the
Ohio law, complaints under the Minnesota law can be filed “at a tactically
calculated time so as to divert the attention of an entire campaign from the
meritorious task at hand of supporting or defeating a ballot question.”208 In
addition, the complaint can result in “possibly diffusing public sentiment
and requiring the speaker to defend a claim before the OAH, thus inflicting
political damage.”209
The court also found the Minnesota law both over-inclusive and underinclusive. Again focusing on the ability of anyone to file a complaint, the
court found that, while only knowingly false factual assertions may be
within the literal scope of the law, the proceedings confirmed that “there is
nothing to prohibit the filing of a complaint against speech that may later be

201.
202.
203.
2005)).
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Id. at 787.
Id. at 787–96.
Id. at 787 (quoting Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F. 3d 738, 751 (8th Cir.
Id. at 787.
Id. at 789.
Id. (citing Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2344–46 (2014)).
Id. at 790.
Id.
Id.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018

196

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:167

found wholly protected.”210 By the time the OAH starts the process of
weeding out unmeritorious claims, however, “damage is done, the extent
which remains unseen.”211 For this reason, the court found the law overinclusive.212 At the same time, it found the prohibition under-inclusive due
to its exemption of “news items or editorial comments by the news media”
and its limitation to “paid political advertising or campaign material.”213
Finally, the court found that the state had “not offered persuasive
evidence” to show why the less restrictive means of “counterspeech” would
not as effectively accomplish the state’s asserted compelling interest in
promoting fair and honest elections.214 Echoing a sentiment expressed
decades earlier by Justice Sanders in 119 Vote No! Committee, the court
concluded its opinion by insisting that “[t]he citizenry, not the government,
should be the monitor of falseness in the political arena. Citizens can digest
and question writings and broadcasts in favor or against ballot
initiatives . . . .”215
6. Commonwealth v. Lucas
Commonwealth v. Lucas, a remarkable case heard by the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts, involved the criminal prosecution of a
political action committee leader for distributing literature critical of a
candidate for public office.216 In October 2014, Jobs First Independent
Expenditure Political Action Committee (“Jobs First”) distributed
brochures critical of Brian Mannal, an incumbent candidate for the
Massachusetts House of Representatives.217 The brochures included the
following statements:
Brian Mannal chose convicted felons over the safety of our
families. Is this the kind of person we want representing us?
Helping Himself: Lawyer Brian Mannal has earned nearly
$140,000 of our tax dollars to represent criminals. Now he wants
to use our tax dollars to pay defense lawyers like himself to help
convicted sex offenders.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Id. at 792.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 794.
Id. at 793.
Id. at 796.
34 N.E.3d 1242, 1244–45 (Mass. 2015).
Id. at 1245.
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Brian Mannal is putting criminals and his own interest above our
families.218
Approximately two weeks prior to the 2014 general election, Mannal
filed an application for a criminal complaint in state court against Melissa
Lucas, the chairwoman and treasurer of Jobs First, alleging that she
published knowingly false statements in violation of Massachusetts law
prohibiting false campaign statements.219 Mannal coordinated this filing
with a press conference at which he detailed the reasons for the complaint
and suggested that the brochures “could put [Lucas] behind bars.”220 Lucas
filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, alleging that the Massachusetts
false statement law was unconstitutional.221 A probable cause hearing was
set for approximately two weeks after the election.222 Mannal won
reelection by 205 votes.223 After the probable cause hearing, a magistrate
issued a complaint formally charging Lucas with violating the false
statement law.224 Lucas then petitioned the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts for relief from the criminal complaint on the ground that the
false statement law was unconstitutional.225 The high court, in an opinion
by Justice Robert J. Cordy, unanimously agreed, finding the law
“antagonistic to the fundamental right of free speech,” and ordered that the
criminal complaint against Lucas be dismissed.226
218. Id.
219. Id. The law in question provided:
No person shall make or publish, or cause to be made or published, any
false statement in relation to any candidate for nomination or election to public
office, which is designed or tends to aid or to injure or defeat such candidate.
No person shall publish or cause to be published in any letter, circular,
advertisement, poster or in any other writing any false statement in relation to
any question submitted to the voters, which statement is designed to affect the
vote on said question.
Whoever knowingly violates any provision of this section shall be punished
by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars or by imprisonment for not
more than six months.
MASS GEN. LAWS, ch. 56, § 42 (2016), quoted in Lucas, 34 N.E.3d at 1244–45 n.1.
220. Lucas, 34 N.E.3d at 1245.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 1246.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 1257. The court rested its holding on the free speech guarantee of the
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights rather than on First Amendment grounds. See id. at
1252. But the court relied primarily on First Amendment jurisprudence in finding that the
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Like the United States Supreme Court in SBA List and the Eighth Circuit
in 281 Care Committee, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts was
acutely aware of the potential for broad restrictions on campaign lies to be
used strategically for political gain. The state argued that the complaint
against Lucas should be dismissed on statutory rather than constitutional
grounds because the statements at issue were opinions beyond the scope of
the law.227 In response, the court explained that even if the statute were
confined to false statements of fact, it could still be misused.228 It pointed
out that in the case at hand a candidate used the filing of an application for a
criminal complaint “as a political tool not only to discredit the statements
[in Jobs First’s brochure] but also to persuade [Jobs First] to refrain from
airing a political advertisement shortly before the election. . . . . Thus even
if the application had been dismissed, the damage was already done.”229
The court also emphasized that “anyone may initiate a complaint . . . and, in
so doing, create lingering uncertainties of a criminal investigation and chill
political speech by virtue of the process itself.”230
Having rejected the state’s argument for avoiding the constitutional
issue, the court considered whether the regulated speech fell within either
the fraud or defamation exception to the constitutional protection of free
speech.231 With regard to fraud, the court explained that “any legitimate
interest in preventing electoral fraud must be done by narrowly drawn laws
designed to serve those interests without unnecessarily interfering with First
Amendment freedoms.”232 Because the false statement law did not require a
showing of reliance or damages, which the court deemed to be essential
elements of fraud, it found the law reached not just fraud but expression
that is not fraudulent.233 For that reason, the law “cut[] too far into other
protected speech.”234
false campaign statement law violated the Massachusetts Constitution, as well as lower court
cases holding that false statement laws in other states violate the First Amendment. See id. at
1252–57.
227. Id. at 1246.
228. Id. at 1247–48.
229. Id. at 1247 (citing 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 776 F.3d 774, 790 n.12 (8th Cir.
2014)).
230. Id. (citing United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 733 (2012) (Breyer, J.,
concurring)).
231. Id. at 1248.
232. Id. at 1249.
233. Id.
234. Id. (quoting United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 316 n.2 (2008) (Souter, J.,
dissenting)). In a footnote, the court mentions the state’s argument that a false factual
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The court found the state’s attempt to “shoehorn” the false statement law
into the defamation exemption to be similarly flawed.235 It observed that
while some false campaign speech might be defamatory, other types of
false campaign speech, such as candidates’ statements about themselves or
comments about a ballot proposition, are not capable of being
defamatory.236 Accordingly, because the false statement law regulated
protected speech, the court subjected the law to strict scrutiny.237
Applying strict scrutiny, the court stated that “[a]s a general matter” it
agreed that the state has a “compelling interest in the maintenance of free
and fair elections.”238 It added that this interest includes “preserving the
integrity of its election process”239 such as by “thwart[ing] political
corruption, voter intimidation, and election fraud.”240 This did not mean,
however, that the state has “carte blanche to regulate the dissemination of
false statements during political campaigns.”241 In particular, the state’s
“claim that it is enhancing the ability of its citizenry to make wise decisions
by restricting the flow of information to them must be viewed with some
skepticism.”242 The court found such skepticism well founded because the
state did not establish that the law was “actually . . . necessary to serve the
compelling interest in fair and free elections.”243 To the contrary, the court

statement might be unprotected even in the absence of a showing of concrete harm if it
threatens the “integrity of Government processes.” Id. at 1249 n.8 (quoting Alvarez, 567
U.S. at 721). The court rejected that argument because the state did not show that the range
of speech prohibited by the false campaign statement law posed “an actual and substantial
threat to the electoral process.” Id.
235. Id. at 1249.
236. Id. at 1250.
237. Id. The court noted the argument that Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion in Alvarez
mandates the application of intermediate scrutiny to laws outlawing false statements of fact
but opined that the opinion “abrogated the well-established line of First Amendment
precedent holding that content-based restrictions on political speech must withstand strict
scrutiny.” Id. at 1251. Because “the applicable standard for content-based restrictions on
political speech is clearly strict scrutiny” under the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights,
however, it applied that standard to the false statement law. Id. at 1251–52.
238. Id. at 1252.
239. Id. (quoting Eu v. San Francisco Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 231
(1989)).
240. Id.
241. Id. (quoting 281 Care Committee v. Arneson, 766 F.3d, 774, 787 (8th Cir. 2014)).
242. Id. (quoting 281 Care Committee, 766 F. 3d at 787).
243. Id. at 1252.
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found that counterspeech was an adequate and much safer remedy for
campaign lies.244
Finally, the court addressed what it called the “rather remarkable
argument” that the state has broader power to restrict speech in the election
context than it does with respect to speech generally.245 The court
responded that, to the contrary, “First Amendment rights of speech and
association have their ‘fullest and most urgent application precisely to the
conduct of campaigns for political office.’”246 It then dealt with the state’s
specific argument, bolstered by language in McIntyre, that “the state
interest in preventing fraud carries special weight during election
campaigns”247 and that the Massachusetts false statement law “reaches
falsehoods far more insidious and difficult to discredit on the eve of an
election than, for example, the lie uttered in Alvarez.”248 The court
acknowledged the point that the “the shortened time frame of an election”
may make counterspeech an ineffective remedy.249 Still, this distinction
could not save the law at issue because it was not “narrowly tailored” to
address this problem.250 Rather, the Massachusetts false statement law
applied not only to the election of public officers, but also to ballot issues,
and not only to statements widely disseminated through commercial
advertisement, “but also those exchanged between two friends engaged in a
spirited political discussion in a local pub.”251 In addition, the law applied
“to a broad range of content that does not pose a realistic threat to the
maintenance of fair and free elections.”252
7. Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus
In 2014, shortly after the Supreme Court ruled that the plaintiffs had
Article III standing to pursue a pre-enforcement challenge to Ohio’s false
244. Id. at 1253.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 1253–54 (quoting Weld for Governor v. Dir. of the Office of Campaign &
Political Fin., 556 N.E.2d 21 (Mass. 1990)). In making this statement, the court failed to
mention Justice Scalia’s observation in his dissent in McIntyre that “protection of the
election process justifies limitations upon speech that cannot constitutionally be imposed
generally.” McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 378 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
247. Lucas, 34 N.E.3d at 1254 (citing McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 349).
248. Id. at 1254.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 1255.
252. Id.
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campaign statement law,253 the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of Ohio ruled on the merits of the challenge, holding the law to be an
unconstitutional infringement of the First Amendment.254 In 2016, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed this
decision.255 The Sixth Circuit began its opinion by determining the proper
level of scrutiny to apply to the law.256 Finding it to be a content-based
regulation of “core-protected” political speech, the court applied strict
scrutiny.257 The court agreed that the state’s interests “in preserving the
integrity of its elections, protecting ‘voters from confusion and undue
influence,’ and ‘ensuring that an individual’s vote is not undermined by
fraud in the election process’” are compelling.258 But for five reasons, it
found that the law was not “narrowly tailored to protect the integrity of
Ohio’s elections.”259
First, the court found that the timing of the administrative process
established by the law “does not necessarily promote fair elections.”260 The
court noted that while the law provides for expedited procedures for
complaints filed close to an election, “complaints filed outside this
timeframe are free to linger for six months.”261 And even with the expedited
procedure, there is no guarantee that proceedings would conclude before
the election “or within time for the candidate’s campaign to recover from
any false information that was disseminated.”262 As a result, “candidates
filing complaints against their political opponents count on the fact that ‘an
ultimate decision on the merits will be deferred until after the relevant
election.’”263 The court held that a final finding occurring after the election
“does not preserve the integrity of the election,” and, therefore, that the law
was not narrowly tailored to promote this interest.264

253. See Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334 (2014); see also supra notes
83–106 and accompanying text.
254. See Susan B. Anthony List v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 45 F. Supp. 3d. 765 (2014).
255. Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 814 F.3d 466 (2016).
256. Id. at 472.
257. Id. at 473.
258. Id. (quoting Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 199 (1992) (plurality opinion)).
259. Id. at 474.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 474 (quoting Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2346
(2014)).
264. Id.
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Second, the court faulted the law’s procedural mechanism for failing to
screen out frivolous complaints prior to a probable cause hearing.265 As a
result, “some complainants use the law’s process ‘to gain a campaign
advantage without ever having to prove the falsity of a statement . . .
tim[ing] their submissions to achieve maximum disruption [and] . . .
forc[ing political opponents] to divert significant time and resources . . . in
the crucial days leading up to an election.’”266 In this way, too, the process
was not narrowly tailored to promote Ohio’s interest in preserving fair
elections.267 A third reason the court found the law not narrowly tailored to
preserve fair elections was that it applied to all false statements, including
non-material statements.268
A fourth flaw the court found with the law was that it applied not just to
the speaker of the false statements, but also to “anyone who advertises,
‘post[s], publish[es], circulate[s], distribute[s], or otherwise disseminate[s]’
false political speech.”269 As such, the law applied to commercial
intermediates, such as the billboard company dissuaded in this case from
accepting the SBA List’s advertisement.270 “Conducting hearings against or
prosecuting a billboard company executive, who was simply the
messenger,” the court found, “is not narrowly tailored to preserve fair
elections.”271
Fifth, and finally, the court found the law to be both over- and underinclusive.272 It was over-inclusive because “[c]ausing damage to a campaign
that ultimately may not be in violation of the law” does not preserve the
integrity of elections, but rather “undermines the state’s interest in
promoting fair elections.”273 And it was under-inclusive because “the law
may not timely penalize those who violate it, nor does it provide for
campaigns that are the victim of potentially damaging false statements.”274
265. Id.
266. Id. at 475 (quoting SBA List, 134 S. Ct. at 2346).
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id. For good measure, the court added that the false statement laws “ha[d] similar
features” to the Ohio law prohibiting anonymous leafleting that the Supreme Court struck
down in McIntyre. Id. at 476. The court noted that the “Supreme Court struck down Ohio’s
election law because its prohibitions included non-material statements that were ‘not even
arguably false or misleading,’ made by candidates, campaign supporters, and individuals
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***
In summary, in contrast to the mixed results of earlier cases, recent lower
court decisions have uniformly found broad bans on lies in political
campaigns to violate the First Amendment. This is true whether the
challenged law governs ballot measures, candidate elections, or both.
Moreover, relevant Supreme Court decisions strongly suggest that the Court
would reach the same conclusion about a general ban on campaign lies. The
open question concerns narrowly focused bans such as those forbidding
intentionally false or misleading statements about election procedures or
requirements or about incumbency or party affiliation. Whether such laws
comport with the First Amendment depends on the scope of the rule against
content discrimination—the central question explored in Part II.
II. The Basic Structure of American Free Speech Doctrine
The ability of government to punish campaign lies consistent with the
First Amendment depends in large part on how one views the basic
structure of American free speech doctrine. Under a commonly held view,
aptly dubbed the All-Inclusive Approach, the First Amendment generally
protects human expression—in all of its manifestations and wherever it may
occur—from government-imposed content regulation. On this view,
government has little or no authority to regulate election lies. An alternative
view, which I shall call the Domain-Specific Approach, posits that the
government’s ability to regulate the content of speech depends on the
setting or domain in which the speech occurs. On this view, at least some
speech occurring in the election domain, including some types of lies,
might be subject to punishment. As I shall demonstrate, the DomainSpecific Approach more accurately describes the actual structure of free
speech doctrine than does the All-Inclusive Approach.
A. The All-Inclusive Approach
Under the All-Inclusive Approach, “as a general matter, the First
Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression
because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”275
acting independently and using only their own modest resources,” whether made “on the eve
of an election, when the opportunity for reply is limited, or months in advance.” Id. (quoting
McIntyre v. Ohio, 514 U.S. 334, 351–52 (1995)). In the court’s view, Ohio’s false statement
laws “ha[d] all of the same flaws” and, therefore, were “not narrowly tailored to preserve
fair elections.” Id.
275. Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion in Alvarez exemplifies the All-Inclusive
Approach: “content-based restrictions on speech have been permitted, as a
general matter, only when confined to the few historic and traditional
categories of expression long familiar to the bar.”276 The exceptions noted
by Justice Kennedy are “advocacy intended, and likely, to incite imminent
lawless action, obscenity, defamation, speech integral to criminal conduct,
so-called ‘fighting words,’ child pornography, fraud, true threats, and
speech presenting some grave and imminent threat the government has the
power to prevent.”277 So, on this view, while government has a great deal of
leeway to regulate speech for reasons unrelated to its message (such as the
time, place, or manner of the speech),278 content-based regulations are
subject to “the most exacting scrutiny.”279 For content-based laws to be
justified under this test, the government must prove that they are “narrowly
tailored to serve compelling state interests.”280 Application of such “strict
scrutiny” almost always results in the regulation being declared invalid.281
As noted above, laws regulating electoral lies unquestionably do so
based on the content of the speech; thus, under the All-Inclusive Approach,
the government would have an exceedingly difficult burden to justify the
prohibition of electoral lies.
The All-Inclusive Approach is supported by statements in other Supreme
Court decisions282 as well as by prominent commentators.283 But as has
276. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717 (2012).
277. Id. at 717 (internal citations omitted).
278. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
279. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641–42 (1994) (“Our
precedents thus apply the most exacting scrutiny to regulations that suppress, disadvantage
or impose differential burdens upon speech because of its content.”)
280. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015).
281. See Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015). (“[I]t is the rare case in
which a State demonstrates that a speech restriction is narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling interest.”); see also United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 731 (2012) (Breyer,
J., concurring) (noting that strict scrutiny implies “near automatic condemnation” of the law
under review); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 314 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(“Under strict scrutiny [a law], for the most part, cannot survive.”); McIntyre v. Ohio
Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 380 (1995) (Scalia, J. dissenting) (describing strict
scrutiny as “ordinarily the kiss of death”); Richard H. Fallon Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54
UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1304 (2007) (“[T]he Supreme Court has sometimes suggested that
strict scrutiny will permit infringements of preferred rights only to avert rare, catastrophic
harms. The Court has frequently described the freedom of speech in terms that make its
claims sound almost categorically unyielding.”).
282. E.g., United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,
505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992).
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been aptly observed, the position that there is “a general, ‘normal’
conception of free speech right[s] that applies the same in nearly all
contexts” is, upon close examination, “long on rhetoric and short on
substance.”284 Any such view is inconsistent with both the scope and level
of protection actually provided to speech in American society. In addition
to the “narrow categories of expression” that the proponents of the AllInclusive Approach acknowledge can be prohibited because of their
content, there is in fact an enormous range of speech routinely regulated on
account of its content, all without a hint of interference from the First
Amendment. This includes expression regulated by securities, antitrust,
labor, copyright, food and drug, and health and safety laws, together with
the array of speech regulated by the common law of contract and
negligence.285 In addition, there are numerous Supreme Court holdings
providing less-than-strict scrutiny to content-based regulation of expression
beyond the “narrow exceptions” recognized by the All-Inclusive Approach,
including commercial speech; sexually explicit (but non-obscene) speech;

283. For example, Dean Erwin Chemerinsky asserts:
[T]here are some categories of speech that are unprotected or less protected by
the First Amendment, such as incitement or illegal activity, obscenity, and
defamation. These categories, by definition, are content-based. But apart from
these categories, content-based discrimination must meet strict scrutiny, and the
Court has recently indicated that content-based distinctions within these
categories must also pass strict scrutiny.
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 933 (3d ed. 2006);
see also JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1254 (8th ed.
2010) (“If the government wants to punish speech based on its content apart from these
categories, the government bears a heavy burden of proving that its regulation is one that is
narrowly drawn to promote . . . a compelling government interest.”); Andrew Koppelman,
Revenge Pornography and First Amendment Exceptions, 65 EMORY L.J. 661, 662 (2016)
(“Content-based restrictions (unless they fall within one of the categories of unprotected
speech) are invalid unless necessary to a compelling state interest.”).
284. Frederick Schauer & Richard H. Pildes, Electoral Exceptionalism and the First
Amendment, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1803, 1819–20 (1999).
285. See Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary
Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1768, 1778–84 (2003); see
also James Weinstein, Speech Categorization and the Limits of First Amendment
Formalism: Lessons from Nike v. Kasky, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1091, 1097–98 (2004)
[hereinafter Weinstein, Speech Categorization]. To adopt Schauer’s useful terminology, this
speech is not just devoid of protection, but because its regulation “does not present a First
Amendment issue at all,” it is outside First Amendment “coverage.” Schauer, supra at 1769.
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and speech in a non-public forum.286 Of particular importance to our
inquiry, the government routinely regulates the content of speech in settings
over which it exercises managerial control, such as the courtroom, the
government workplace, and the public school classroom. 287 Contrary to the
assumption underlying the All-Inclusive Approach, then, there is in fact no
general rule against content regulation of speech.
B. The Domain-Specific Approach
In contrast, the Domain-Specific Approach readily accounts for these
numerous examples of permissible content regulation. It postulates that the
prohibition against content regulation is primarily confined to expression
essential to democratic self-governance—expression that the Court and
commentators often refer to as “public discourse.”288
1. The Domain of Public Discourse and the Right to Lie289
It is in the domain of public discourse that the people—the ultimate
governors in a democracy—can freely examine and discuss the rules,
norms, and conditions that constitute society. Such expression includes
more than “political speech in the narrow sense”: it also embraces more
generally “speech concerning the organization and culture of society.”290
286. See James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as the Central Value of American
Free Speech Doctrine, 97 VA. L. REV. 491, 492 (2011) [hereinafter Weinstein, Participatory
Democracy].
287. See Weinstein, Speech Categorization, supra note 285, at 1097.
288. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 22 (1971); Robert C. Post, The
Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation,
and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601 (1990). Since this democratic
expression is not always aimed at the public, however, but also includes informal
conversations between two friends or a small group of individuals, the term “democratic
discourse” is more descriptive. See James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as the Basis
of American Free Speech Doctrine: A Reply, 97 VA. L. REV. 633, 642 (2011) [hereinafter
Weinstein, A Reply]. However, since the term “public discourse” is commonly used to
describe this domain, I will use that term in this Article.
289. This section of the Article draws substantially from material previously published in
James Weinstein, Climate Change Disinformation, Citizen Competence, and the First
Amendment, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. 341 (2018).
290. ERIC BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH 189 (2005). There is no simple algorithm for
determining whether expression qualifies as public discourse entitled to rigorous protection
from content discrimination. It is possible nonetheless to identify two factors that are crucial
to making this determination: (1) whether the speech is about a matter of public concern; and
(2) whether the expression occurs in settings dedicated or essential to democratic selfgovernance, such as on the internet or in books, magazines, films, or public forums such as
the speaker’s corner of the park. For a more extensive discussion of methodology by which
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Within this domain, every proposition is open to question. For if
government were allowed to manage the content of this discussion, either
by excluding certain ideas as wrong or offensive or even by setting the
agenda, the opinion formed by public discussion would not reflect the
independent will of the people, but would rather reflect the preferences of
those temporarily entrusted to govern society.291 In this domain, even the
most minimal of civility norms may not be enforced for fear that such
regulation will inevitably reflect the cultural or political norms of some
particular community when it is these very norms that are up for debate.292
Thus, in this domain, a speaker is allowed to use words or symbols of the
speaker’s choosing, even highly inflammatory ones.293 And of particular
relevance for our inquiry, in this domain, government is generally
prohibited from punishing even knowing misstatements of fact.
Public discourse promotes vital democratic interests of both speakers and
audience.
a) Speaker Interests
The opportunity to participate in public discourse is vital to the
legitimacy of the legal system in that it allows individuals to have their say
about laws that bind them.294 There may be no fully satisfactory answer to
the age-old question of what justifies the state’s use of force to make free
and autonomous people obey laws with which they reasonably disagree.
the Court has drawn the boundaries of public discourse, see Weinstein, A Reply, supra note
288, at 639–41.
291. As James Madison declared in the Report on the Virginia Resolutions of 1789,
denouncing the Alien & Sedition Act: “The people, not the government, possess the absolute
sovereignty.” See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 274 (1964) (quoting 4 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 569–70 (1876)).
292. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26
(1971).
293. See Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment
Jurisprudence, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2355, 2371 (2000) (“Even irrational and abusive speech can,
within particular circumstances, serve as a vehicle for the construction of democratic
legitimacy.”).
294. For an extensive discussion of how the opportunity to participate in public discourse
as speakers promotes political legitimacy, see James Weinstein, Hate Speech Bans,
Democracy and Political Legitimacy, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 527 (2017) [hereinafter
Weinstein, Hate Speech Bans]; James Weinstein, Free Speech and Political Legitimacy: A
Response to Ed Baker, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 361 (2011); see also Thomas Scanlon, A
Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 204, 214 (1972) (arguing that for a
government to be legitimate, citizens must be able to recognize its authority “while still
regarding themselves as equal, autonomous, rational agents”).
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But the democratic process—in particular, the ability to vote for
representatives who enact the laws and the opportunity to freely criticize or
support laws that representatives are considering enacting—is “arguably the
best that can be done . . . for justifying the legitimacy of the social order.”295
In addition to promoting legitimacy in this essential, normative sense, the
opportunity to participate in public discourse contributes to “the descriptive
conditions necessary for a diverse and heterogeneous population to live
together in a relatively peaceable manner under a common system of
governance and politics.”296
Crucially, the opportunity to freely and openly participate in public
discourse promotes not just the legitimacy of the entire legal system, but
also the legitimacy of particular laws. In a recent article, I discussed, for
instance, how restrictions on peoples’ ability to use what other democracies
would consider unlawful “hate speech” to oppose antidiscrimination
measures will diminish—or may, under certain circumstances, even
destroy—the legitimacy of enforcing these measures against those whose
speech was curtailed.297
As vital to democracy and political legitimacy as the right to participate
in public discourse may be, these interests do not, at least as a theoretical
matter, entail a right of a speaker to try to deceive the public by proclaiming
as fact something the speaker knows to be untrue. Pragmatically, however,
there is good reason not to entrust government officials with the power to
determine the truth or falsity of factual claims made in the often highly
ideological context of public discourse, especially when the claims are
factually complex or uncertain.298 There is even greater reason to distrust
the ability of government officials to fairly and accurately determine the
speaker’s state of mind in making the allegedly false statement.
Specifically, government officials hostile to the speaker’s point of view
are more likely to believe that the speaker knew that the statement was
false, while officials who share the speaker’s ideological perspective will be
more likely to find that any misstatement of fact was an innocent one. For
295. C. Edwin Baker, Autonomy and Free Speech, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 251, 262, 263
(2011).
296. Robert Post, Legitimacy and Hate Speech, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 651, 651 (2017).
297. See Weinstein, Hate Speech Bans, supra note 294, at 566–74.
298. “[Our] forefathers did not trust any government to separate the true from the false
for us.” Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring). For examples
of factual misstatements on complex, highly contentious issues of public concern, see James
Weinstein, Seana Shiffrin’s Thinker-Based Theory of Free Speech: Elegant and Insightful,
but Will It Work in Practice?, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 385, 395–96 (2011).
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this reason, I shudder at the thought of authorities in Alabama having the
power to prosecute an abortion rights activist because they have concluded
that the speaker intentionally made false or misleading statements about
how often partial-birth abortion is medically necessary; I similarly recoil at
the thought of California officials prosecuting an anti-abortion activist for
falsely misrepresenting the extent to which abortion causes depression. It is
no answer that judges, at trial and on appeal, provide a safeguard against
speakers being wrongfully punished for making knowing misstatements of
fact in public discourse. For one, in highly ideological cases even judges are
subject to “judicial viewpoint discrimination.”299 But even if the speaker is
ultimately vindicated, defending against a prosecution or even an
investigation can be an expensive and arduous process.
As discussed in more detail below, it may be true that, even when the
serious pragmatic problems just described are accounted for, allowing
government some limited power to punish knowingly false factual
statements in public discourse would improve the quality of public debate.
But the core speaker interest protected by the First Amendment is not
principally concerned with the quality of public discussion; rather, its focus
is the legitimacy that the opportunity to participate in public discourse
confers on the legal system. So despite any improvement in the quality of
public discourse, prosecuting lies in this domain will likely deter speakers
from making honest but mistaken claims on highly contentious matters of
public concern. As a result, the legitimacy of the legal system would be
diminished. For this reason, consistent with what seems to be the view of
all nine justices in Alvarez, the core democratic value underlying the First
Amendment ordinarily protects an individual from legal sanction for
making even intentional misrepresentations of fact in public discourse.
Suppose that Alan, a popular libertarian blogger with a scientific
background, is persuaded by his perusal of relevant, peer-reviewed
literature that the case for anthropogenic climate change is overwhelming.
He confides as much in an email to his sister. Nonetheless, for ideological
reasons, Alan believes that proposed climate legislation is wrong in
principle and bad for the American economy. So, in addition to making
economic arguments against such legislation, Alan persistently contends
that the evidence for anthropogenic climate change is more uncertain than
he knows it to be. If a prosecutor in a state with particularly broad antifraud laws were to prosecute Alan for misleading the public through his
299. See James Weinstein, Free Speech, Abortion Access, and the Problem of Judicial
Viewpoint Discrimination, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 471 (1996).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018

210

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:167

deceitful commentary, the First Amendment would no doubt bar such a
prosecution. Indeed, because the right of an individual in the United States
to participate in public discourse is so rigorously protected, few prosecutors
in this country would even consider prosecuting a blogger for even
intentional misstatements of facts designed to mislead the public with
regard to the desirability of legislation.
b) Audience Interests
(1) The Interest in Receiving Information on Matters of Public Concern
Another important democratic interest served by free and open public
discourse is the audience interest in receiving information needed to
develop informed views on matters of public policy.300 And while only
flesh-and-blood individuals have democratic interests in participating in
public discourse, “[c]orporations and other associations, like individuals,
contribute to the ‘discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information
and ideas’ that the First Amendment seeks to foster.”301 It could be
powerfully argued, however, that lies not only fail to promote but actually
undermine “the discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information”
needed by citizens to knowledgeably participate in public discourse and to
competently perform their electoral duties.
A powerful argument for extending First Amendment protection to lies
in order to promote the audience’s interest in access to information and
perspectives is the concern, discussed above, that government officials
cannot be trusted to fairly and accurately identify and prosecute knowingly
false statements in the often highly ideological context of public discourse.
It is possible that “the risk of censorious selectivity by prosecutors”302
would impede information and distort perspectives made available to the
audience to such an extent that the cure would be worse than the disease.
Still, even when the likely distorting effects of selective prosecutions are
accounted for, it may be that the accuracy—and, hence, the reliability and
usefulness—of the information available to citizens would be enhanced if
lies in public discourse were not protected by the First Amendment.
Whether granting government the power to punish lies in public
discourse will impede or promote the audience interest in receiving useful
information and perspectives is a difficult empirical question. So, if
300. See Weinstein, Participatory Democracy, supra note 286, at 500–01.
301. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 343 (2010) (quoting First Nat’l Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978)).
302. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 736 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring).
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providing information and perspectives to the electorate were the only
consideration, a good case might be made that the First Amendment should
not protect intentional factual misrepresentations in public discourse.
Standing in the way of this conclusion, however, is a deep, though
underexplored, principle of American popular sovereignty.
(2) The Interest in Being Treated as Rational Agents Capable of
Exercising Authority as Ultimate Sovereign
As James Madison wrote in denouncing the Sedition Act of 1798, “The
people, not the government, possess the absolute sovereignty.”303 For this
reason, as Madison had earlier observed in discussing the nature of popular
sovereignty, “the censorial power is in the people over the Government, and
not in the Government over the people.”304 To vindicate this basic
democratic precept, the First Amendment forbids the government from
punishing speech even if the government believes the expression will lead
the electorate to make unwise or even disastrous social policy decisions.305
Imagine that certain persuasive voices in public discourse were
influencing public opinion against ratification of a treaty essential to our
national security. Even if it could be shown to a moral certainty that
rejection of this treaty would have catastrophic consequences for the nation,
including greatly increasing the risk of nuclear attack on our soil, it would
be unthinkable within our democratic traditions for the government to
prohibit public opposition to the treaty.306 And I would suggest that it is no
303. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 274 (1964) (quoting 4 ELLIOT’S
DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 569–70 (1876)).
304. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 934 (1794).
305. The First Amendment “embodies our trust in the free exchange of ideas as the
means by which the people are to choose between good ideas and bad . . . . The State’s fear
that voters might make an ill-advised choice does not provide the State with a compelling
justification for limiting speech.” Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 60 (1982); Thomas v.
Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“But it cannot be the duty,
because it is not the right, of the state to protect the public against false doctrine.”).
306. See, e.g., THOMAS CHRISTIANO, THE RULE OF THE MANY: FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES IN
DEMOCRATIC THEORY 15–16 (1996) (“[C]itizens have a right to rule because the right
embodies the liberty or the equality of citizens. Even if citizens make bad decisions on
certain occasions, it remains that the mistakes are rightfully theirs to make.”); see also
Thomas Christiano, Democracy, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Spring 2015),
https://plato.stanford.edu/cgi-bin/encyclopedia/archinfo.cgi?entry=democracy
[https://perma.cc/JX8A-6L2H] (“[T]he right of self-government gives one a right, within
limits, to do wrong. Just as an individual has a right to make some bad decisions for himself
or herself, so a group of individuals have a right to make bad or unjust decisions for
themselves regarding those activities they share.”).
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more permissible for government to suppress this expression because it
contains factual misrepresentations calculated to mislead the public into
opposing the ratification of the treaty. This is because the First Amendment
presumes that, in our capacity as the ultimate governors of society, we are
rational agents capable of sorting out truth from falsity without government
supervision.307 As Justice Robert Jackson eloquently explained more than
seventy years ago, “The very purpose of the First Amendment is to
foreclose public authority from assuming a guardianship of the public
mind . . . In this field every person must be his own watchman for truth.”308
This is not to say, of course, that humans in general, or the American
populace in particular, are, in fact, fully rational beings. We obviously are
not. But the attribution of rationality to participants engaging in public
discourse is not a description; it is, rather, an ascription. As Justice Jackson
suggests, this ascription derives from the basic democratic precept that “We
the People,” who possess the ultimate sovereign power, are capable of selfgovernment without the need of government guardianship to keep us from
being misled in our capacity as ultimate sovereign.309 Through this lens,
allowing government to determine which claims in public discourse are true
and which are false would present not just the pragmatic difficulties I have
emphasized; such government guardianship would in principle violate the
core democratic precept that the people are capable of ruling themselves.
To see why governmental suppression of lies in public discourse to
prevent the people from being misled is contrary to a basic precept of
popular sovereignty—at least as traditionally understood in this country—
imagine that you are a ruler who originally possessed all of the political
power in a certain society. In order to form a “more perfect” society,
“establish Justice,” etc., you “ordain and establish” a constitution, which,
among other things, delegates legislative power to a national assembly.
Despite this delegation, however, you retain the ultimate sovereignty in this
society, including the power to select the members of the assembly, to
directly make provincial laws, and to adopt a new constitution.
Suppose that the assembly passes a law empowering your ministers to
keep from you any publication that in their judgment contains knowing
307. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 355 (2010) (stating that our form of
government “entrust[s] the people to judge what is true and what is false”).
308. Thomas, 323 U.S. at 545 (Jackson, J., concurring).
309. See id. at 545–46 (“This liberty was not protected because the forefathers
expected . . . that its exercise always would be wise, temperate, or useful . . . . [T]his liberty
was protected because they knew of no other way by which free men could conduct
representative democracy.”).
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falsehoods that might deceive you into making the wrong decision in the
exercise of your retained power. Let us further suppose that, although there
is a possibility that such censorship will deprive you of valuable
information or perspectives you need to make these decisions, on balance it
is more likely that this guardianship arrangement will improve the quality
of the information you receive. Even with the possibility of receiving more
accurate information, wouldn’t you prefer that, instead of being prevented
from having access to any mendacious material, your ministers let you see
it while pointing out to you the statements that they thought were untrue? It
seems to me that this advisory arrangement would better respect your
authority as ultimate sovereign than would the guardianship arrangement.
What this thought experiment shows, I believe, is that government might
properly add its own voice to the discussion and advise citizens that a
statement made in public discourse is a lie. But it also suggests that
punishing speakers for making knowing factual misrepresentations in order
to prevent these lies from deceiving the people about the desirability of
legislation or any other matter of public concern is inconsistent with the
people’s role as the ultimate governors of society.
The Supreme Court would undoubtedly agree that bans on knowing
misstatements in public discourse run afoul of the First Amendment. As
Justice Kennedy explained in United States v. Alvarez, “Our constitutional
tradition stands against the idea that we need Oceania’s Ministry of
Truth.”310 Rather, “The remedy for speech that is false is speech that is
true.”311 And both the concurring and dissenting opinions in that case
expressed similar sentiments.312

310. 567 U.S. 709, 723 (2012).
311. Id. at 727
312. See id. at 731–32 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“Laws restricting false statements about
philosophy, religion, history, the social sciences, the arts, and the like . . . in many
contexts . . . call[] for strict scrutiny.”); id. at 751–52 (Alito, J., dissenting) (stating that
“laws prohibiting false statements about history, science, and similar matters” would present
a “grave and unacceptable danger of suppressing truthful speech”). The one exception is the
imposition of civil liability, subject to various First Amendment safeguards, for defamation
of public officials or of private figures on matters of public concern, see Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283
(1964). But the rationale for defamation laws is to protect individual reputations, not to
prevent the people from being misled about some matter within their authority as ultimate
governors of society. As discussed below, the precept that it is wrong in principle for the
government to prohibit lies in public discourse to prevent the audience from being misled
carries over to the election domain. See infra note 344 and accompanying text.
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2. Government-Managed Domains
While government regulation of the content of speech in the domain of
public discourse must be strictly limited for this domain to accomplish its
core democratic purpose, in other settings, pervasive government
management of various activities—including speech—is essential if
government is to accomplish its various functions.313 Thus, in settings
devoted to some purpose other than public discourse—such as effectuating
government policy in the workplace, the administration of justice in the
courtroom, or education in public schools—government has far greater
leeway to regulate the content of speech.314 For instance, although an antiwar protestor has a right to wear a jacket on a public street bearing the
message “Fuck the Draft,”315 profanity may be constitutionally banned in
the government workplace, in the courtroom, and in the public
classroom.316 Similarly, while a blogger may have a First Amendment right
to make knowingly false claims about the causes and effects of climate
change, a government employee can, consistent with the First Amendment,
be fired for making a knowingly false statement on this subject in a
government report.317 Likewise, a student can be disciplined for lying to his
313. In conceptualizing the terrain of speech regulation as being divided into various
domains, I have been heavily influenced by the seminal work of Robert Post. See, e.g.,
ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY AND MANAGEMENT
(1995).
314. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983) (holding that the discharge of
assistant district attorney for criticism of her superior did not violate the First Amendment);
Zal v. Steppe, 968 F.2d 924, 925–26, 928 (9th Cir. 1992) (rejecting First Amendment
challenge by an attorney defending anti-abortion protestors who was held in contempt for
violating a court order prohibiting the attorney from using words such as “baby killer” linked
to excluded defenses because “[d]uring a trial, lawyers must speak . . . with relevance and
moderation”).
315. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971).
316. See Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986) (rejecting First
Amendment challenge by a student suspended for using “offensively lewd and indecent
speech” at a high school assembly); Bonnell v. Lorenzo, 241 F.3d 800, 820–21 (6th Cir.
2001) (concluding that a university instructor’s suspension for using profane language in
class did not violate the First Amendment); Martin v. Parrish, 805 F.2d 583, 586 (5th Cir.
1985) (rejecting a First Amendment challenge by a university instructor discharged for
persistent use of profanity in the classroom); Jackson v. Bailey, 605 A.2d 1350, 1359 (Conn.
1992) (upholding a contempt conviction against the party for using profanity in the
courtroom); Dargi v. Terminix Int’l Co., 23 S.W.3d 342, 346 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000)
(upholding a contempt conviction against the party for use of profanity during a deposition).
317. See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 720 (2012) (discussing 18 U.S.C. §
1001 (2012), which criminally punishes a person who “in any matter within the jurisdiction
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teacher about why he did not turn in on time his report on climate change,
and an expert witness in a court case can be convicted for making
knowingly false statements about climate change.318 There can be
reasonable disagreement about whether the right to engage in invective and
lies in public discourse promotes or hinders democratic self-governance;
but there can be no doubt that such expression is inimical to the proper
functioning of government-managed domains such as the workplace, the
classroom, and the courtroom.
3. Elections as a Government-Managed Domain
In a previous article, I suggested that “the election domain” is “a sphere
which the Constitution permits, and on occasion, even requires the
government to manage.”319 This claim should be uncontroversial, for there
can be no sensible objection to the government setting the time for an
election, designating polling places, designing the ballot, providing voting
apparatus, counting the ballots, and announcing the results. Indeed,
government has an affirmative constitutional duty to provide for elections320
and to conduct them in a fair and equitable manner.321 So the question is not
whether a government-managed domain of elections exists322 but rather
of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States,
knowingly and willfully—(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or
device a material fact; (2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or
representation; or (3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to
contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry”).
318. See Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 720 (acknowledging the “unquestioned constitutionality of
perjury statutes”) (internal quotations omitted).
319. James Weinstein, Campaign Finance Reform and the First Amendment: An
Introduction, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1057, 1083 (2002). For a comprehensive discussion of
elections, including election speech, as a domain distinct from the domain of public
discourse, see Schauer & Pildes, supra note 284. See also C. Edwin Baker, Campaign
Expenditures and Free Speech, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1998) (conceiving election
speech as “institutionally bound” as part of the governmentally structured institution of
elections); Richard Briffault, Issue Advocacy: Redrawing the Elections/Politics Line, 77
TEX. L. REV. 1751 (1999) (distinguishing between the realm of politics and political speech,
on the one hand, and elections and election-related speech, on the other).
320. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554–55 (1964); see also Ex parte Yarbrough,
110 U.S. 651, 662 (1884); John L. Watts, Tyranny by Proxy: State Action and the Private
Use of Deadly Force, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1237, 1269 (2014) (“[E]lections must also be
considered a non-delegable governmental function.” (citing Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461,
469 (1953) (plurality opinion)).
321. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 110 (2000).
322. See Joel L. Fleishman, The 1974 Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments: The
Shortcomings of Good Intentions, 1975 DUKE L.J. 851, 863–64 (“There can be no elections
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what activities are properly assigned to that domain. In Part III of this
Article, I will discuss the crucial and difficult question of which type of
campaign lies may be properly regulated as part of the election domain and
which are properly deemed part of public discourse. But first, I will note the
many other forms of campaign speech that government may
constitutionally regulate as part of its authority to manage the election
domain.
The propriety of some speech regulation in this domain is undisputed—
for instance, laws mandating that candidates’ names appear with equal
prominence on the ballot.323 More controversially, the Supreme Court has
upheld as consistent with the First Amendment the power of government to
exclude the names of marginal parties and candidates from the ballot;324 to
prohibit write-in voting, even when such voting is engaged in as a means of
political protest;325 and to forbid electioneering speech near the polls.326
Tellingly, in upholding these restrictions the Court has expressly affirmed
rationales for speech regulation that would be patently improper for
regulating public discourse.
In Burdick v. Takushi, for instance, in upholding a prohibition on writein voting, the Court observed that “the function of the election process is to
winnow out and finally reject all but the chosen candidates”327 and that
“[a]ttributing to elections a more generalized expressive function would
undermine the ability of States to operate elections fairly and efficiently.”328
There can be no doubt, however, that the Court would roundly condemn as
unconstitutional any attempt by government to regulate the content of
public discourse to make it operate “fairly and efficiently.”
Similarly, in Jenness v. Fortson, in permitting the exclusion of marginal
candidates from the ballot, the Court explained: “There is surely an
important state interest in requiring some preliminary showing of a
significant modicum of support before printing the name of a political
organization’s candidate on the ballot—the interest, if no other, in avoiding
without rules to guide them, and, for more than a century at the federal level, rules have been
enacted, and sustained by courts, which go beyond simple facilitation of election mechanics
to regulate in detail how candidates and their supporters might permissibly behave.”)
(citations omitted).
323. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-466 (2004) (detailing uniformity required in
candidates’ appearance on the ballot).
324. Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971).
325. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 438 (1992).
326. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992).
327. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 438 (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 735 (1974)).
328. Id.
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confusion, deception, and even frustration of the democratic
process . . . .”329 As with regulation to promote fairness and efficiency, it
would be blatantly unconstitutional for government in the United States to
regulate the content of public discourse to avoid “confusion [or] deception”
or “even frustration of the democratic process.”
In Burson v. Freeman, which upheld a ban on solicitation of votes and
the display or distribution of campaign materials within 100 feet of the
entrance to a polling place, the Court relied on the state’s interest in
preventing “intimidation and fraud.”330 While the state has some closely
circumscribed power to prevent these harms by regulating the content of
public discourse,331 it plainly has no such power to achieve these ends by
such broad, prophylactic measures.332 Professors Frederick Schauer and
Richard Pildes are therefore surely correct in characterizing elections as
“highly structured spheres” that include speech regulations “that would be
impermissible in the general domain of public discourse.”333
Significantly, the power of government to regulate speech within the
election domain extends beyond the polling place and the ballot. As I have
previously suggested, campaign finance laws often regulate activities at the
cusp of the public discourse and election domains.334 From this perspective,
the Supreme Court’s decisions in this area can be seen as attempting to give
each domain its due by assigning some election financing activities to the
domain of public discourse, while placing other activities in the election
domain.335 Such an allocation is most apparent in the Court’s
contribution/expenditure dichotomy. Noting that large contributions have
the potential to corrupt or appear to corrupt elected officials, and finding
that contribution limitations only marginally affect speech, the Court in
effect assigned contributions to the election domain, thereby allowing
government considerable authority to regulate this activity.336 In contrast,
the Court has found independent expenditures for election speech to be an
329. Jenness, 403 U.S. at 442.
330. Burson, 504 U.S. at 211.
331. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003); Illinois ex rel. Madigan v.
Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600 (2003).
332. McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014); Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better
Env’t, 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
333. Schauer & Pildes, supra note 284, at 1816; accord McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 378–79 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (observing that “protection of
the election process justifies limitations upon speech that cannot be imposed generally”).
334. Weinstein, Speech Categorization, supra note 285, at 1082–84.
335. Id. at 1084–85.
336. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 20–21, 59 (1976).
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essential part of the public debate and, thus, assigned this activity to the
realm of public discourse where it has received rigorous protection.337
Disclosure requirements provide another example of the government’s
ability to regulate electoral speech in a way that would be impermissible
with respect to public discourse. Despite well-established precedent
recognizing the right of speakers engaged in public discourse to speak
anonymously,338 the Court has upheld laws requiring political
advertisements on behalf of candidates to disclose the names of the
sponsors of the advertisements.339 Cases involving public employee speech
provide another example. While the First Amendment generally protects the
right of public employees to participate in public discourse,340 the Court has

337. Id. at 19–20, 39, 45–54. The Court in Buckley did not expressly acknowledge this
dichotomy as reflecting domain allocation and may not even have perceived of elections as
being a distinct domain from public discourse. See Baker, supra note 319, at 29 (“Buckley
did not even take up the possibility of viewing electoral speech as part of an institutionallybound governing process.”); Schauer & Pildes, supra note 284, at 1825 (explaining that the
Court in Buckley did not confront the question of whether “elections can be demarcated, for
First Amendment purposes, from the general domain of public discourse.”). Indeed,
adopting something akin to the All-Inclusive approach, it purported to apply “strict scrutiny”
to contribution limitations. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48–49. As the Court subsequently
acknowledged, however, this is not the level of scrutiny actually employed in such cases:
“[W]hen reviewing Congress’ decision to enact contribution limits, there is no place for a
strong presumption against constitutionality, of the sort often thought to accompany the
words ‘strict scrutiny.’ . . . The less rigorous standard of review we have applied to
contribution limits (Buckley’s ‘closely drawn’ scrutiny) shows proper deference to Congress’
ability to weigh competing constitutional interests in an area in which it enjoys particular
expertise.” McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 137 (2003) (internal quotations omitted),
overruled on other grounds, Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). Although recent
cases have applied somewhat greater First Amendment scrutiny to contributions to political
candidates, see, e.g., McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441–42 (2014); Randall v.
Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 236 (2006), it is still far less rigorous than the protection provided
independent expenditures.
338. E.g., Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
339. See, e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366–71; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64–76. As
discussed above, in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 334 (1995), the Court
invalidated a law prohibiting the distribution of anonymous literature concerning a ballot
initiative. As discussed below, restrictions on lies about ballot initiatives, as opposed to lies
by and about candidates for elected offices, should be allocated to the domain of public
discourse rather than to the election domain. See infra Sections III.B, III.C.2.
340. See United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454 (1995); Pickering v.
Bd. of Ed., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
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upheld restrictions on public employees’ ability to participate in electoral
politics, including speaking in favor of a candidate for office.341
The cases just discussed suggest that government generally has more
authority to regulate speech, including false statements of fact, in the
election domain than it does in the domain of public discourse. But this is
not always the case. Indeed, speech in the election domain is, arguably,
sometimes entitled to greater protection than it would be in public
discourse.342 So Schauer and Pildes are correct in observing that “we could
decide that elections constitute[] a distinct domain for First Amendment
purposes without committing to what we would do within that domain.”343
Relatedly, although public discourse and elections are usefully
conceptualized as distinct domains, they share a similar purpose in that they
are the two indispensable features of democratic self-governance. Whatever
else it may be, a political system lacking either free and fair elections or the
right of citizens to participate in public discourse is no democracy. For this
reason, both when participating in public discourse and when engaging in
our electoral functions, we are acting in our capacity as ultimate sovereign.
Accordingly, the basic precept of American popular sovereignty discussed
in Section II.B.1, above, applies to the election domain as well as the
domain of public discourse. This means that, as lower courts have held,344 it
341. See U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973);
United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
342. There is some suggestion in the case law that defamatory statements about
candidates for elected office should be entitled to absolute immunity, not just the New York
Times v. Sullivan malice standard generally applicable to defamatory statements about the
official duties of those who hold that office. See, e.g., Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S.
265, 271–72 (1971) (stating that because the First Amendment “has its fullest and most
urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office,” publications
concerning candidates “must be accorded at least as much protection under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments as those concerning occupants of public office” (emphasis added));
see also Rickert v. Wash. Pub. Disclosure Comm’n, 168 P.3d 826, 833 (Wash. 2007)
(Alexander, C.J., concurring) (suggesting that the plurality opinion could be interpreted as
holding that the First Amendment provides absolute immunity against defamation suits by
candidates for elected office). Accord, Schauer & Pildes, supra note 284, at 1808 n.24.
(suggesting that the Court in Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45 (1982), might have provided
absolute immunity to false campaign promises rather than the qualified immunity of New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)). See also Arkansas Educational Television
Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 669 (1998) (indicating that a public broadcaster’s exclusion of
a candidate from a candidate debate is subject to greater First Amendment scrutiny than
other exercises of editorial judgment by a public station.).
343. Schauer & Pildes, supra note 284, at 1808.
344. See 281 Care Committee v. Arneson, 766 F.3d 774, 790 (8th Cir. 2014) (“observing
that [t]he citizenry, not the government, should be the monitor of falseness in the political
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is wrong in principle for government to ban lies in political campaigns in
order to prevent the electorate from being misled about a matter within its
collective decision making authority. As we will see, however, this crucial
limitation nevertheless leaves room for banning lies for other reasons.
But while elections and public discourse are the two essential
components of democracy, and while there is considerable overlap in the
democratic functions they serve (particularly in promoting political
legitimacy), there are also significant differences in the purposes of these
democratic domains. Most significantly, an important function of public
discourse is to provide citizens with information and perspectives needed to
“vote wise decisions,”345 while the key purpose of elections is to enable
citizens to select their governors or, through ballot initiates, to enact laws
directly.
Another significant difference inheres in the reasons that government
regulates these two essential democratic domains. When government seeks
to regulate public discourse, it usually does so for reasons not directly
related to promoting democratic self-governance, such as preserving public
order, protecting individual dignitary interests, or defending national
security. In contrast, regulations on speech in the election domain, be it a
ban on writing in candidates or a prohibition on election lies, are usually
justified as promoting the fairness or efficiency of an essential democratic
process. As such, unlike regulation of speech in public discourse, regulation
of speech in the election domain usually involves democracy on both sides
of the ledger. For this reason, it is true both that the First Amendment “has
its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns

arena”); Rickert v. Washington, 168 P.3d 826, 827–28 (Wash. 2007) (criticizing the claim
that “the State possesses an independent right to determine truth and falsity in political
debate” as “fundamentally at odds with the principles embodied in the First Amendment”);
State ex rel. Pub. Disclosure Comm’n v. 119 Vote No! Comm., 957 P.2d 691, 698–99
(Wash. 1998) (referring to the “claimed compelling interest to shield the public from
falsehoods during a political campaign” as “patronizing and paternalistic” because it
“assumes the people of this state are too ignorant or disinterested to investigate, learn and
determine for themselves the truth or falsity in political debate, and it is the proper role of
the government itself to fill the void”). See also Commonwealth v. Lucas, 34 N.E.3d 1242,
1256 (Mass. 2015) (quoting statement from 281 Care Comm. quoted above).
345. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS
OF THE PEOPLE 26 (1960).
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for political office”346 and that “no justification for regulation is more
compelling than protection of the electoral process.”347
III. Allocating Laws Regulating Election Lies to Their Proper Domain
As illustrated by the cases discussed in Part I, the typical approach to
deciding whether a prohibition on false statements in the election context
violates the First Amendment is to assess to what level of scrutiny the law
should be subjected. Under the All-Inclusive Approach, laws punishing
even knowing falsehoods not fitting within “the few historic and traditional
categories of expression long familiar to the bar”348 are subject to strict
scrutiny and, thus, “near-automatic condemnation.”349 Not only does this
approach have the potential to invalidate laws that should be deemed
constitutional, it also clouds analysis of the interests at stake. With respect
to laws that judges wish to uphold, this approach would likely obscure
analysis as well as distort doctrine by requiring them to procrusteanly force
the law into one of these “traditional” exceptions. Alternatively, judges
wanting to uphold bans on campaign lies could apply a watered-down
version of strict scrutiny, thereby weakening a test that performs an import
function in protecting public discourse.350
The use of intermediate scrutiny for measuring the validity of laws
regulating false campaign statements, which dicta in Justice Breyer’s
plurality opinion in Alvarez appears to endorse,351 provides a better vehicle
than does the All-Inclusive Approach for analyzing the relevant interests
and for reaching correct results. It is nonetheless sub-optimal, for it does not
directly consider how the law in question might affect the domains of
public discourse and elections.
The framework I propose, in contrast, seeks first to properly allocate the
law in question either to the domain of public discourse or to the election
346. Monitor Patriot Co., 401 U.S. at 272.
347. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 379 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
348. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717 (2012) (quoting Simon & Schuster, Inc.
v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 127 (1991) (internal quotations
omitted)).
349. Id. at 731 (Breyer, J., concurring).
350. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2235 (2016) (Breyer, J., concurring);
Weinstein, Participatory Democracy, supra note 286, at 512; see also Baker, supra note
319, at 6.
351. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 730–31, 736 (Breyer, J., concurring). See supra note 76 and
accompanying text. See also supra note 237.
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domain; it then focuses on the proper level of scrutiny to be applied. To
determine the domain to which the law should be assigned, this framework
inquires: (1) the extent to which the law in question advances the core
purposes of the election domain to promote fair and efficient elections; as
compared to (2) the extent to which the law in question impairs the core
democratic purposes of the domain of public discourse to promote political
legitimacy and to provide the public with useful information and
perspectives.352
As mentioned above, it is very likely that the United States Supreme
Court would invalidate on First Amendment grounds a broad-based
prohibition of campaign lies, such as the Minnesota and Ohio laws struck
down by the Eighth and Sixth Circuits in 281 Care Committee and SBA
List, respectively.353 The domain-allocation framework I propose is
consistent with the results in these cases. As we shall see, under the
domain-allocation framework, much of the speech regulated by such broad
bans on campaign lies would be deemed public discourse, rendering these
law substantially overbroad and, hence, facially unconstitutional. In
contrast, narrower laws directly promoting the fairness and efficiency of
elections might well pass constitutional muster. An example of such
narrowly-focused laws are those prohibiting false statements about election
procedures, such as the day the election will be held, the proper place to
cast one’s vote, or voting requirements.
A. Laws Prohibiting False Statements About the Time, Place, or Manner of
Voting
In a lucid and insightful article on regulation of campaign lies, Professor
Richard Hasen discusses the constitutionality of punishing knowingly false
statements about the day an election is going to be held.354 He gives an
example of the false statement that “Republicans vote on Tuesday,
Democrats vote on Wednesday.”355 I agree with Hasen that it should be
constitutional for a state to criminalize such speech if made both with

352. Accord Robert Post, Regulating Election Speech Under the First Amendment, 77
TEX. L. REV. 1837, 1842–43 (1999) (“How we decide which speech gets incorporated into
the [election domain], and which speech remains within public discourse, must . . . depend
on a full assessment of the impact on public discourse and on elections.”).
353. See supra Sections I.A.4, I.B.5, I.B.7.
354. Richard L. Hasen, A Constitutional Right to Lie in Campaigns and Elections?, 74
MONT. L. REV 53 (2013).
355. Id. at 71.
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knowledge that the statement was false and with the intent to deceive.356 I
also agree that government has a compelling interest in protecting the right
to vote, that these laws present little risk of selective prosecution, and that
the falsity of this speech is easily verifiable.357 I suggest, however, that the
framework I propose offers more telling reasons that such a law does not
violate the First Amendment.
Looking first to the election domain, laws banning knowing falsehoods
calculated to deceive someone about when to vote directly promote the
fairness of the election. Indeed, if government were powerless to stop such
deception, the integrity of the election process might be badly
compromised. As to the effect of the law on the domain of public discourse,
by no latitude of interpretation can such knowingly false statements about
election procedures, as opposed to false statements about the substance of
an election, be characterized as an attempt by the speaker to persuade others
about “the organization and culture of society” or otherwise as contributing
to the formation of public opinion. For this reason, the proscription does not
violate the precept of American popular sovereignty, discussed in Section
II.B.1, that it is wrong in principle for government to prohibit false
statements in order to prevent the people from being misled about some
collective decision within the authority as ultimate sovereign.
Relatedly, banning such expression will not diminish the legitimacy of
the legal system with respect to someone prevented from engaging in such
intentional misstatements. Similarly, banning false statements about when
an election will be held obviously will not deprive the electorate of valuable
information or perspectives; nor will such a narrowly-targeted ban “chill”
the expression of any useful information.
To be sure, the miniscule risk of selective enforcement and the easily
verifiable falsity of these statements—factors Hasen emphasizes—are
relevant to this analysis. Similarly, that the state may have a “compelling,”
rather than just an important, reason to ban such lies is surely a relevant
consideration. However, the significance of these considerations is better
understood, I believe, within this overall framework.
For the reasons just stated, bans on knowingly false statements about
election procedures should be allocated to the election domain. Such an
allocation does not mean, however, that a law automatically comports with
the First Amendment (or, for that matter, with any other constitutional
limitation). In light of exceedingly strong reasons for outlawing lies about
356. Id. at 57.
357. Id. at 71.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018

224

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:167

the date of an election and the corresponding lack of impairment to any free
speech or other constitutional values resulting from the ban, there is no
conceivable claim that this law is not a proper exercise of governmental
management of the election domain.
In contrast, other laws properly allocated to the election domain may
raise more substantial constitutional concerns. For example, as Hasen
correctly concludes, laws prohibiting misleading, as opposed to literally
false, statements about an election procedure can present difficult
questions.358 He gives as an example the statement “bring identification
with you to the polls” in a state that does not have a voter identification
requirement. Such a statement might deter voters without identification
from voting.359
A law prohibiting intentionally misleading, as well as literally false,
statements about election procedures would, like a law proscribing only
false statements, vindicate an important, perhaps even compelling, purpose
of the election domain. Concededly, the greater scope and uncertainty of
such a law might have a more significant impact on the legitimizing and
information functions of the domain of public discourse. Still, since it
proscribes only intentionally deceptive statements about election
procedures, not opinions about the subject of the election, the detriment to
this domain would be minimal. Thus, like a ban on literally false
statements, this law should be allocated to the election domain. But if, as
Hasen contends, such a law “would open up prosecutorial discretion and the
potential for political gamesmanship,”360 then the law should be deemed
unconstitutional. It should be invalidated, however, not because it fails to
pass the strict scrutiny applicable to content-based restrictions on speech in
the domain of public discourse. Rather, if Hasen is right in his assessment,
it should be unconstitutional because the law on balance fails to promote,
and may even undermine, the key purpose of the election domain to
promote fair elections.
Having considered regulations on a type of speech falling squarely
within the election domain, I now want to move to the other end of the
spectrum and discuss regulations that, in my view, should unquestionably
be allocated to the domain of public discourse.

358. Id. at 71–72.
359. Id. at 72.
360. Id.
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B. Laws Punishing Lies About Ballot Measures
Suppose that Beth, a reproductive rights activist opposing a state ballot
initiative restricting certain abortion procedures, makes statements that she
knows to be false about the medical necessity of late-term abortions. This
lie seems for First Amendment purposes basically indistinguishable from
Alan’s lie, discussed above, about the causes and effects of climate
change.361 Even if prohibiting lies in public discourse would improve the
reliability of the information and perspectives provided to the electorate,
such restrictions would, as I argued above, also have a significant,
detrimental effect on the legitimacy of the legal system as a whole, as well
as on the morality of enforcing particular laws against dissenters. The only
relevant difference between Alan’s lies and Beth’s lies is that the
cumulative effect of lies about a ballot initiative are arguably more likely to
result in misguided laws than lies in public discourse that influence public
opinion generally. And lies made by official sponsors of a ballot measure or
by committees, such as those alleged in 119 Vote No! Committee, might
have a particularly pernicious effect as compared to bloggers like Beth
lying about a ballot measure.
To begin with, the interest in preventing voters from being deceived into
enacting misguided laws does not directly relate the core function of the
election domain of assuring fair and efficient elections. But more
fundamentally, this justification runs headlong into the basic principle of
popular sovereignty that, as discussed in Section II.B.1, it is wrong in
principle for government to prohibit speech in order to prevent the people
from being misled about a matter within their capacity as ultimate
sovereign. For this reason, laws prohibiting lies about ballot initiatives
should be allocated to the domain of public discourse, where they will be
subject to strict scrutiny and invalidated.362
C. Laws Regulating Lies by and about Candidates
As just discussed, with respect to laws banning lies about ballot
measures, it makes no difference if the law punishes an independent
speaker or the official sponsors of the measure. In contrast, with regard to
laws prohibiting lies in candidate elections, the distinction between speech
361. See supra Section II.B.1.a.
362. Because the basic precept of American popular sovereignty that it is wrong for
government to punish lies in public discourse in order to prevent the people from adopting
an unwise law carries over to the election domain, the result would be the same even if the
law were allocated to the election domain. See supra note 344 and accompanying text.
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made independent of a candidate’s campaign and speech made by a
candidate or those associated with a candidate’s campaign becomes crucial.
1. Laws Prohibiting Anyone from Making Knowingly or Recklessly False
Statements about a Candidate for Public Office
Suppose that Beth, the pro-choice blogger, falsely accuses a pro-life
candidate for the United States Senate of having recently paid for his
daughter to have an abortion. Suppose further that, in making this
allegation, Beth had no reason to believe that it was true: she just made it
up. Finally, suppose that Beth is criminally charged under a law prohibiting
knowingly or recklessly false statements about a candidate for political
office.
For basically the same reasons I gave in discussing Beth’s lie about the
ballot measure, a law punishing Beth for this lie should be allocated to the
domain of public discourse. This assignment, however, does not necessarily
mean that the lie is protected. If accusing someone of paying for an abortion
is defamatory under these circumstances, the First Amendment would not
protect the statement. But it does mean that lies about candidates should be
treated precisely the same as speech by citizens about elected officials made
in public discourse, with all of the constitutional protections afforded such
expression. Accordingly, a law that prohibited anyone from lying about a
candidate for public office, as did a provision of the Ohio law at issue in
SBA List, would be vulnerable to invalidation as substantially overbroad.363
2. Laws Prohibiting Lies by a Candidate About an Opponent
Now suppose instead that this false accusation is made not by an
individual acting independently of the campaign, but rather by the opposing
candidate or that candidate’s organization.364 Under the proposed
framework, this law should be assigned to the election domain. The law
directly promotes the fairness concern of the election domain by punishing
lies by candidates or their organizations about other candidates. Indeed,
such a law can be thought of as a basic ground rule for a fair contest
analogous to a rule prohibiting boxers from hitting each other below the
belt. Relatedly, as Professor William Marshall observes about campaign
falsehoods in general, “false statements can lead or add to voter alienation
363. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973).
364. The Kentucky law involved in Brown v. Hartlage, though not proscribing lies
generally, applied only to speech by candidates. In contrast, the Ohio law, which generally
proscribed election lies, applied to anyone. Compare Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, with
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol71/iss1/8

2018]

FREE SPEECH AND DOMAIN ALLOCATION

227

by fostering cynicism and distrust of the political process.”365 Scurrilous
campaign lies by candidates about their opponents are likely to be a
particularly potent source of voter alienation. Accordingly, laws seeking to
curb such expression will also promote this concern of undoubted relevance
to the election domain.
At the same time, laws limited to prohibiting lies by candidates, or those
acting in concert with them, will not impair the core legitimating function
of the domain of public discourse. Unlike restrictions against lying in public
discourse imposed on ordinary citizens like Alan or Beth, laws prohibiting
candidates from lying about their opponents will not significantly diminish
a candidate’s allegiance to the legal system or undermine the morality of
applying to candidates for public office laws with which they can
reasonably disagree. Although a subsidiary purpose of a candidate’s speech
might sometimes be to contribute to public opinion in the hopes of
changing laws or policy, this is rarely, if ever, the primary purpose of such
speech. Rather, the dominant purpose of such expression is to influence
public opinion in order to get elected.
A more realistic concern is the adverse consequences that such laws
might have on candidates’ supplying the electorate with useful information.
Specifically, it is possible that the beneficial effect of a ban on knowing or
reckless falsehood by candidates would be outweighed by the “chilling
effect” such a prohibition might have on truthful speech. Mitigating this
concern is the requirement, common in contemporary laws regulating
campaign lies, that the government must show by clear and convincing
evidence that the false statement was made with knowledge of its falsity or
with reckless disregard for the truth. On balance, then, a law prohibiting a
candidate from making false statements about another candidate should be
deemed part of the election domain rather than part of the domain of public
discourse.
Again, this does not mean that such a law is necessarily constitutional.
Of particularly serious concern is “the risk of censorious selectivity by
prosecutors” noted by Justice Breyer. Relatedly, there is reason to be
skeptical about whether “government is capable of correctly and
consistently negotiating the thin line between fact and opinion in political
speech.”366 There is, it is true, little to be concerned about in this regard
when the statement is easily verifiable, as with, for instance, an accusation

365. William P. Marshall, False Campaign Speech and the First Amendment, 153 U. PA.
L. REV. 285, 295 (2004).
366. Rickert v. Washington, 168 P.3d 826, 829 (Wash. 2007).
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that a candidate has been convicted of a felony. It is with more complicated
questions that this problem will likely arise, such as with claims about “a
candidate’s voting record on a particular issue.”367 Determining whether
such claims are true or false “may very well require an in-depth analysis of
legislative history that will often be ill-suited to the compressed time frame
of an election,” making any such determination “exceedingly difficult.”368
It could therefore be strongly argued that the purpose of the election
domain in promoting fair elections will actually be undermined rather than
promoted by bans on election lies even if limited to falsehoods by
candidates about their opponents. I do not, however, have the expertise in
election law to make a confident judgment about this difficult empirical
matter.
Another objection is that punishment of even knowing falsehoods
violates the basic precept of American popular sovereignty, discussed in
Section II.B.1, that the people must be trusted, free from government
guardianship, to separate truth from falsehood. Significantly, however, as
also explained above, a ban on candidates making knowingly or recklessly
false accusations about an opponent can fairly be justified on different
grounds—namely, maintaining rules for a fair contest and preventing voter
alienation.369 No doubt part of the motivation for the proscription of lies by
candidates is to keep the voters from being misled.370 But it is a familiar and
salutary feature of First Amendment jurisprudence that the validity of a law
is judged by its justification, not the actual motivation of legislators who
enacted it.371

367. Commonwealth v. Lucas, 34 N.E.3d 1242, 1256 (2015).
368. Id. An example of a claim about a voting record whose truth or falsity is
“exceedingly difficult” to ascertain is the accusation in Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus,
814 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2016), that Congressman Driehaus supported taxpayer-funded
abortion because he voted for the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. See Sam
Baker, The Right to Lie in Campaigns Is Safe, for Now, THE ATLANTIC (June 16, 2014),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/06/the-right-to-lie-in-campaigns-is-safefor-now/440508/ (“SBA List believes its attack is entirely true, citing the structure of the
health care law’s insurance subsidies, which calls into question whether an attack like this
one could ever be ruled definitively true or false.”).
369. It is true that these justifications are intrinsically bound up with preventing the
electorate from being misled. But, as with defamation laws, preventing people from being
misled is not the ultimate justification. See supra note 312.
370. Cf. Marshall, supra note 365, at 294 (“First, and most obviously, false statements
can distort the electoral process.”).
371. See, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
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3. Prohibition of False or Misleading Statements by Candidates About
Incumbency or Party Affiliation
There can be little doubt that prohibition of false statements by a
candidate about matters of incumbency or party affiliation are properly
allocated to the election domain. Such a prohibition directly promotes the
domain’s core function of promoting fair and efficient elections. For
instance, government must have authority to designate incumbency or party
affiliation on the ballot. Laws prohibiting candidates from falsely claiming
that they are the incumbent or the nominee of a political party, or from
making statements likely to mislead voters about these matters, are directly
related to this authority. In contrast, any effect of such prohibitions on the
legitimizing or informational function of public discourse would be de
minimis.
Considered as part of the government’s authority to regulate speech in
the domain of elections, a law banning literally false claims by candidates
about incumbency or party affiliation, made either knowingly or recklessly,
presents no substantial constitutional concern. A somewhat more difficult
issue is raised by the prohibition of misleading claims, such as those
involved in Treasurer of Committee to Elect Lostracco v. Fox,372 one of the
election cases cited in Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion in Alvarez.
There, the campaign material of a judicial candidate referred to the
candidate as “Judge Fox.”373 While this statement was arguably not literally
false in that Fox, who was running for Circuit Judge, was currently a
District Judge, this usage was likely to mislead a voter into thinking that
Fox was the incumbent Circuit Judge and, thus, give him an unfair
advantage over his opponent.374 While Breyer is certainly correct that, in
the political process, “the risk of censorious selectivity by prosecutors” is
generally “high,” it is not at all apparent that this is true with respect to
misleading claims about incumbency and party affiliation. For this reason,
such laws should be deemed facially constitutional, with any challenges to
selective prosecution made on an “as applied” basis.

372. 389 N.W.2d 446 (1986).
373. Id. at 447.
374. Id. at 447–48. Because the ultimate justification is fair play among candidates, this
justification would not violate the precept, discussed in Section II.B.1, that it is wrong in
principle for government to suppress speech to prevent the people from being misled about a
collective decision within their capacity as ultimate sovereign. See supra note 369 and
accompanying text.
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4. Comprehensive Bans on Lies by Candidates
Finally, we come to laws that broadly ban candidates from knowingly or
recklessly making false statements material to an election, including lies
about themselves. To begin with, the “ground rule for a fair election”
justification for such a comprehensive ban on lies is more attenuated than
with a prohibition against candidates lying about other candidates. On the
other hand, a broader proscription might more effectively advance the
interest in preventing voter alienation. With respect to its effect on public
discourse, a broader ban on candidate lies would, in light of the primary
reason that candidates engaging in campaign speech, likely not have a
significantly greater negative effect on political legitimacy than would a
narrower proscription on candidates lying about each other.
Though such a comprehensive ban on lying by candidates in campaigns
for public office might arguably improve the usefulness of the information
and perspectives that candidate speech provides the electorate, it is also
possible that the “chilling effect” of such a ban could impair the audience’s
vital interest in receiving information. This is a difficult empirical question
that needs further investigation. Still, comprehensive as the ban may be,
since it applies only to candidate speech and its effect on the core
legitimizing function of public discourse would be minimal, such a ban
should be allocated to the election domain.
But even when analyzed as a regulation in such a government-managed
domain, the constitutionality of such a ban can be seriously doubted. Once
again, the major problem would be “the risk of censorious selectivity by
prosecutors,” but now with respect to a vast range of speech, some
involving statements whose falsity will not be readily verifiable. In
addition, as discussed above, such a broad law would be more difficult to
justify as a basic ground rule for fair elections than a narrower ban on
candidates lying about other candidates. And while preventing voter
alienation may be a relevant function of the election domain, it is not
directly related to the domain’s core function to assure fair and efficient
elections. For these reasons, it could be forcefully argued that such a law
would be unconstitutional.
D. The Importance of the Type of Remedy
The type of remedy imposed by a regulation on campaign lies is relevant
both to allocating the regulation to its proper domain and determining
whether the regulation is a constitutional regulation of speech in the domain
to which it is assigned. Criminal sanctions will tend to have a greater
“chilling effect” on non-targeted speech than will civil sanctions. With
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respect to speech about ballot measures or election speech by those not
associated with the campaign, this distinction will not matter: imposition of
even civil penalties would still have an undue chilling effect and, thus,
would be unconstitutional. In contrast, civil penalties rather than criminal
sanctions might support the constitutionality of even broad bans on lies by
candidates.
But a remedy that might assure the constitutionality of a regulation on all
election lies, arguably even including those about ballot initiatives or about
candidates by ordinary citizens, is government counterspeech in the form of
an official determination that a challenged statement is false. A provision
providing for such a procedure was upheld by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Pestrak v. Ohio Elections Commission.375
The Ohio Election Code prohibited anyone during a political campaign
from using campaign materials to publish any “false statement, either
knowing the same is false or with reckless disregard of whether it was
false.” It empowered the Ohio Elections Commission to determine whether
challenged statement violated this provision and to announce its
determination to the electorate.376 The statement at issue, which the
Commission found to be false, was made in a newspaper advertisement
placed by a candidate in a primary election for the office of county
commissioner alleging that the incumbent commissioner had committed
illegal acts.377 The court, in an opinion by Judge Danny J. Boggs, found that
investing the Commission with what it referred to as a “truth declaring”
function squares “exactly with the tenet that ‘the usual cure for false speech
is more speech.’”378

375. 926 F.2d 573, 575 (6th Cir. 1991).
376. Id. at 575, 579.
377. Id. at 575, 576.
378. Id. at 579 (quoting Kleiner v. First Nat’l Bank of Atlanta, 751 F.2d 1193, 1206 n.27
(11th Cir. 1985)). Nine years later, the Ohio Supreme Court upheld against a First
Amendment challenge the authority of the Election Commission under Ohio’s false
statement law to issue a reprimand letter to a candidate for distributing, with knowledge of
its falsity or reckless disregard for whether it was false or not, a brochure accusing his
opponent of bribery. See McKimm v. Ohio Election Comm’n, 89 Ohio St.3d 139 (2000). As
discussed above, the Sixth Circuit recently facially invalidated the Ohio false statements law
in its entirely in Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 814 F.3d 466, 471 (6th Cir. 2016). See
supra notes 253–274 and accompanying text. Shortly thereafter, and relying heavily on the
Sixth Circuit’s decision in Susan B. Anthony List, the Ohio Court of Appeals also found the
law facially unconstitutional. See Magda v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 2016-Ohio-5043, 58
N.E.3d 1188.
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Admittedly, such an official truth declaring function might have some
“chilling effect” on speakers who refrain from making true statements for
fear that the government will brand them liars. Still, any such chilling of
expression is miniscule as compared to the chilling effect of even civil
fines, let alone criminal penalties. A much more formidable objection to
this type of remedy is that it is not the proper role of government to
denounce false claims in the political context; rather, the appropriate
remedy is counterspeech by private citizens or fact checking by news
organizations. But here I think it is important to distinguish between
practical objections to the government assuming this function and the
objection that it is, in principle, wrong for government to play such a role in
the political arena.
The practical objection is that government cannot be trusted to determine
the truth or falsity of statements made in the highly charged and often
partisan context of politics. Particularly in today’s political environment,
this objection has considerable merit. For this reason, at least as a policy
matter—and perhaps even as a constitutional one—even this non-punitive
remedy should not be applied to lies about ballot measures or about
candidates by members of the public not associated with a campaign. In
these contexts, the rough and tumble of public discourse should be allowed
to sort truth from falsity without the supplement of potentially biased
government findings. Where such a remedy would be both useful and
appropriate is as an alternative to coercive measures of questionable
constitutionality, such as a ban on candidates lying about other
candidates.379 Use of this non-punitive remedy would greatly strengthen the
case for the constitutionality of such laws.
The objection on principle, reflected in several lower court opinions,380 is
that it is simply not the job of government to protect people from being
misled by political speech. This is similar to the basic precept of American
popular sovereignty that I identify and discuss in Section II.B.1—but
different in one crucial respect. As I tried to demonstrate in that discussion,
it is wrong in principle for the government to prevent the ultimate
sovereign, which in the United States is “We the People,” from being
exposed to lies in order to prevent the sovereign from being misled about
some matter within the sovereign’s authority. But as I also have tried to
show, it is not in principle wrong for the government to advise the
sovereign that some statement is, in the government’s judgment, a lie. So
379. See supra Section III.C.2.
380. See supra note 344.
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while such a government “Truth Commission” may, for pragmatic reasons,
be a bad idea—and because of these practical concerns arguably even
unconstitutional—such a procedure is not contrary to this basic democratic
precept.
Conclusion
As this Article was to going to press, the United States Supreme Court
decided an important campaign speech case that casts light on several
issues discussed in this Article. In Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky,381
the Court invalidated on First Amendment grounds a state law prohibiting
individuals from wearing political badges, buttons or other political insignia
inside a polling place on Election Day.
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices
Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, Alito, Kagan and Gorsuch, found that a
polling place was a “nonpublic forum.”382 The Court explained that “[t]he
government may reserve such a forum ‘for its intended purposes,
communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is
reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because the
public officials oppose the speaker’s view.’”383 Because the law did not
discriminate on basis of viewpoint, the question for decision was “whether
Minnesota’s ban on political apparel is ‘reasonable in light of the purpose
served by the forum: voting.’”384 To answer this question, the Court first
inquired whether Minnesota was “pursuing a permissible objective” in
banning apparel with political messages inside the polling place.385
The Court easily found that it was. “Casting a vote,” the Court explained,
“is a weighty civic act, akin to a jury’s return of a verdict, or a
representative’s vote on a piece of legislation. It is a time for choosing, not
campaigning.”386 For that reason, the Court held that the government “may
reasonably decide that the interior of the polling place should reflect that

381. 138 S. Ct. 1876 (2018).
382. Id. at 1886. Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Breyer, dissented. She argued that
the Court should have certified the case to the Minnesota Supreme Court for a definitive
interpretation of the political apparel ban. Id. at 1893 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
383. Id. at 1885 (majority opinion) (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators
Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983)).
384. Id. at 1886 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473
U.S. 788, 806 (1985)).
385. Id.
386. Id. at 1887.
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distinction.”387 Thus, the Court concluded that “in light of special purpose
of the polling place itself, Minnesota may choose to prohibit certain apparel
there because of the message it conveys, so that voters may focus on the
important decisions immediately at hand.”388
The Court next inquired whether the regulation was reasonable, and
found that it was not. To pass this reasonableness test, “the State must be
able to articulate some sensible basis for distinguishing what may come in
from what must stay out.”389 But because of the “unmoored use of the term
‘political’ in the Minnesota law, combined with haphazard interpretations
the State has provided in official guidance and representations to this
Court,” the Court held that the restrictions imposed under the law “fail even
this forgiving test.”390 As evidence of the lack of “some sensible basis” for
distinguishing between prohibited and permitted expression under the
Minnesota law, the Court cited the answers given by the Minnesota’s
lawyer at oral argument before the Court:
A shirt declaring “All Lives Matter,” we are told, could be
“perceived” as political. How about a shirt bearing the name of
the National Rifle Association? Definitely out. That said, a shirt
displaying a rainbow flag could be worn “unless there was an
issue on the ballot” that “related somehow . . . to gay rights.” A
shirt simply displaying the text of the Second Amendment?
Prohibited. But a shirt with the text of the First Amendment? “It
would be allowed.”391
Such an “indeterminate prohibition,” the Court admonished, “carries
with it ‘[t]he opportunity for abuse . . . .’”392 And if voters are subject to, or
even witness, “unfair or inconsistent enforcement of the ban, the State’s
interest in maintaining a polling place free of distraction and disruption
would be undermined by the very measure intended to further it.”393
Significantly, however, in invalidating the Minnesota law, the Court
emphasized that it was not saying that, in trying to advance the purposes of
the polling place by banning speech inimical to those purposes, Minnesota
387. Id.
388. Id. at 1888.
389. Id.
390. Id.
391. Id. at 1891 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
392. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Airport Comm’rs v. Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S.
569, 576 (1987)).
393. Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol71/iss1/8

2018]

FREE SPEECH AND DOMAIN ALLOCATION

235

“has set upon an impossible task.”394 It noted that other States “have laws
proscribing displays (including apparel) in more lucid terms.”395
Mansky sends signals both about the method of analysis the Court might
employ in determining the constitutionality of bans on lies in political
campaigns and about which types of bans it might uphold and which it will
likely invalidate. A potentially significant feature of Court’s decision is
that, consistent with the framework I suggest in this Article, the Court
treated Minnesota’s ban on apparel with political messages in the polling
place as a regulation not of public discourse but as a speech regulation in a
government-managed domain. As a result, the Court did not apply strict
scrutiny to what was manifestly a content-based restriction of expression;
rather, it inquired—again consistent with the approach I suggest—whether
this regulation promoted the purposes of the domain in a manner that is
both viewpoint neutral and reasonable.
I do not want, however, to exaggerate the significance of the domain
allocation in this case. Because the law in question regulated speech on
government property, the Court was able to employ “forum analysis” to
allocate the ban on political apparel at issue to a government-managed
domain (that is, a non-public forum). Accordingly, the Court was able to
avoid any conflict with the “All-Inclusive Approach.”396 It remains to be
seen, therefore, whether the Court will engage in such domain allocation
when faced with a narrow ban on campaign lies serving some core purpose
of the election domain but which is not confined to speech on government
property. There are, however, two indications in Mansky that it might be
willing to finally recognize the domain allocation implicit in the cases
discussed above.397
First, there is the Court’s response to the state’s argument that it properly
banned “Please I.D. Me” buttons because they were designed to confuse
voters that they needed photo identification to vote. The Court rejected that
argument because it found that the asserted interest did not align with the
state’s construction of the law.398 In doing so, however, the Court stated:
“We do not doubt that the State may prohibit messages intended to mislead
voters about voting requirements and procedures.”399 Notably, and perhaps
significantly, the Court does not limit its statement that government may
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.

Id.
Id.
See supra Section II.A.
See supra Section III.B.3.
Mansky, 138 S. Ct. at 1889 n.4.
Id.
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undoubtedly prohibit such intentionally misleading speech to expression
occurring in a polling place.
This omission may indicate that if and when faced with a law banning
messages intended to mislead voters about voting requirements and
procedures that it wants to uphold, the Court might extend the governmentmanaged election domain it recognized in Mansky beyond regulation of
speech on government property to other settings. For instance, it might
uphold a ban that applied not just to false or misleading statement in the
polling place but also extended to flyers put under doors of potential voters
reading: “Republicans Vote on Tuesday, Democrats on Wednesday400 and
Make Sure to Bring Photo I.D.”401 Also suggesting that the Court might in
such a case expressly allocate speech occurring beyond the confines of
government property to the election domain is this statement near the end of
its opinion: “Cases like this ‘present[] us with a particularly difficult
reconciliation: the accommodation of the right to engage in political
discourse with the right to vote.”402 It is also possible, of course, that the
Court might, following the plurality opinion it cites for this statement,403
uphold the law as comporting with strict scrutiny.
This brings us to the second—and somewhat clearer—signal that
Mansky sends about regulation of campaign lies. Whether it employs the
domain allocation approach suggested in this Article or subjects the law to
strict scrutiny, the Court seems inclined to uphold narrow restrictions not
just on outright lies about voting requirements and procedures but
intentionally misleading statements on such subjects as well.404 By the same
token, Mansky confirms that whether the Court uses strict scrutiny or the
often more “forgiving” standard applicable to speech regulation in a
government-managed domain,405 broad bans on campaign lies will be found
to violate the First Amendment.

400. See supra note 355 and accompanying text.
401. See supra note 359 and accompanying text.
402. Mansky, 138 S. Ct. at 1892 (quoting Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198 (1992)
(plurality opinion)).
403. See supra note 402.
404. For discussion of an argument that bans on intentionally misleading (as opposed to
literally false) statements about voting requirements and procedures should be deemed
unconstitutional, see supra notes 360 and accompanying text.
405. See Mansky, 138 S. Ct. at 1888.
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